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1. Chapter I – Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 
The unequivocal warming of the global climate system, primarily due to increased 
emissions of carbon dioxide, has to be considered as an undeniable fact of today’s 
world. The effects of climate change are particularly severe in the Earth’s polar 
regions. The average Arctic temperature has increased at almost twice the global 
average rate in the past 100 years.1 A recent report, conducted by the Arctic 
Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), the Arctic Council’s working group 
for environmental monitoring, has highlighted the past six years (2005-2010) as the 
warmest period ever recorded in the Arctic.2 The observed reduction in snow and ice 
extent is consistent with Arctic warming. Modelled projections, reported by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), predicted a decrease in sea ice 
in both the Arctic and Antarctic under all performed scenarios.3 One extreme model, 
mentioned by the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment report (ACIA), projects near 
total melting of Arctic sea ice by the end of the 21st century.4 Yet the decline in sea-
ice extent is considerably faster than projected by the IPCC in 2007, with record low 
levels of persisting sea ice in summer every year since 2001.5 
Climate change and its dangerous effects will lead to unprecedented changes 
and serious threats to the Arctic region, posing significant economic, ecological and 
social challenges and risks. The policy and legal implications as a consequence 
thereof, can be enormous as the environmental changes open up increased 
potentials for shipping, fishing, oil and gas exploration and tourism. 
The Arctic has already become an area of serious economic opportunity, amidst 
of which the prospective establishment of new international maritime trade routes 
stands out.6 Both the Northwest Passage (NWP) and the Northern Sea Route (NSR) 
have the potential to significantly influence global shipping.7 
 
                                                        
1 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC 2007, p. 30 
2 Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme AMAP 2011, p. 4 
3 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC 2007, p. 46 
4 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment ACIA 2005, p. 3 
5 Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme AMAP 2011, p. 6 
6 Chircop 2009, p. 355 and 356 
7 Yet views differ on the extent of a possible impact on international shipping. From today’s 
perspective it is less likely that the NWP will develop into a full international commercial shipping route 
and remain difficult for large-scale commercial shipping. 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1.2. Objective of the thesis 
The objective of this thesis is to exemplify the problematic nature of the NWP in the 
light of jurisdictional disputes regarding the safety of navigation, the related protection 
of the sensitive Arctic marine environment and the international legal status of the 
concerned waters. 
To safeguard the Canadian Arctic marine environment, Canada established an 
Arctic marine traffic system, known as the Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services 
Zone Regulations (NORDREG). These mandatory regulations, which replace the 
informal NORDREG Zone and its voluntary reporting system, require most non-
governmental vessels to report information prior to entering, while operating within 
and upon exiting Canada’s northern/Arctic waters. The NORDREG regulations also 
cover the various routes that together are considered the jurisdictionally disputed 
NWP. Canada claims that the waters in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago are historic 
internal waters (through which no passage right exists under international law), 
whereas the US considers these waters an international strait (with the right of transit 
passage). Subsequently, NORDREG and its mandatory nature came with a 
jurisdictionally and politically disputed baggage. 
Furthermore, Canada asserts that the traffic system is consistent with 
international law concerning ice-covered areas, in particular with the “Arctic 
Exception” of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)8, 
Article 234. This Article stipulates the right of coastal states to adopt laws and 
regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels 
in ice-covered areas. Canada takes the view that the Article provides a complete 
legal justification under international law. Thus it is under no obligation to consult the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) for approval of the NORDREG system. 
                                                        
8 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Montego Bay, 10 December 1982 
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Based on these sets of problems the thesis is aimed at discussing the following 
research questions: 
 
• Are the NORDREG regulations consistent with UNCLOS, Article 234, in 
particular the need to be a law or regulation for the prevention, reduction and 
control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas? 
• Does the current disputed legal status of the NWP under international law lead 
to further problems with regard to the NORDREG regulations? 
• Unilateralism vs. Multilateralism: what is the political reasoning of the involved 
states arguing with regard to a legal or non-legal applicability of the 
NORDREG regulations with Article 234? 
 
A master thesis dealing with the NWP would be considered scientifically incomplete if 
it would not address the jurisdictional dispute regarding the status of the concerned 
waters under international law. Nevertheless and due to the limited scope of the 
thesis, the legal dispute between Canada and the US (in particular, the legal 
approach of historic internal waters vs. international strait) cannot be elaborated 
entirely. Yet the main arguments have been introduced. In order to expand the thesis 
from a purely legal one to a multi-disciplinary one, it aims to outline the possible 
relationship between the prevailing disagreement on the legal status of the NWP and 
the NORDREG dispute, contended in particular in the institutional arena of the IMO. 
 
1.3. Legal sources and methodology 
In consideration of the outlined objective of the thesis, a dual scientific approach, 
allowing for a link between law and political science, has to be regarded as 
academically fruitful. The two disciplines have too long been contemplated as 
separate domains of international relations, both considered as realms of action with 
their own distinctive rationalities and consequences.9 Today’s complex entitlement of 
politics and law, especially in international relations, supersedes this anachronistic 
perspective. 
Yet the legal approach has to be considered as the primary task. The 
methodological focus will incorporate both the method of analyzing international and 
national legal sources, as defined by Article 38 of the Statute of the International 
                                                        
9 Reus-Smit 2004, p. 1 
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Court of Justice (ICJ), as well as the method of interpretation of treaties, set out in 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention).10 
Additionally, Article 32 of the Vienna Convention has to be contemplated with due 
regard to the travaux préparatoires of UNCLOS and its Article 234. 
International law can be described as a set of binding legal norms, regulating the 
relationship between states. A prerequisite and fundamental rule of international law 
is, however, that treaties are only legally binding on states that have consented to be 
bound to them.11 Yet Article 38, paragraph 1(b) of the Statute of the ICJ defines 
international custom as a primary source of international law, resulting from a general 
practice of states. Provisions of treaties can be internationally legally binding on 
states as a result of customary international law and the preceded wide-scale of 
practice of states.12 In this regard, the requirement of opinio juris, which establishes 
the legally binding character of state practice in customary international law, must be 
given in addition.13 
State practice is a flexible term that includes the national impacts for the 
formation of a rule of customary international law, originating in both a collective and 
individual sphere.14 Individual (unilateral) state practice can include legislation 
enacted by national parliaments, the actual enforcement of such legislation by 
national authorities, domestic court decisions, government statements or diplomatic 
correspondence.15 Bi- and multilateral conventions or adopted resolutions by 
“competent international organizations” (e.g. IMO) characterize relevant collective 
state practice.16 State practice can have a legal impact on UNCLOS, as it could be 
used as an element of interpreting the Convention, giving rise to a new rule of 
customary international law or concluding possible legal consequences considering 
inconsistent state practice.17 
Additionally, secondary literature and policy documents have been used in order 
to substantiate the legal argumentation. In this regard a source-critical approach 
seems to be inevitable. 
                                                        
10 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969; see also McRae/Goundrey 1982, p. 215 
and 216. The two authors critically describe a contrast between the ordinary meaning of Article 234 
and the meaning in the light of its context, object and purpose. 
11 McDorman 2009, p. 22 
12 Ibid., p. 24 
13 Birnie/Boyle/Redgwell 2009, p. 16 
14 Molenaar 1998, p. 4 
15 Churchill 2005, p. 92 
16 Molenaar 1998, p. 4 
17 Churchill 2005, p. 93 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1.4. Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is separated in two parts, with Part I focusing on the legal perspective 
(research questions 1 and 2) and Part II concentrating on the political point of view 
(research question 3). Part I is further divided in chapters and sub-chapters. Chapter 
II is considered a necessary first step to introduce the area concerned. It will highlight 
the current status and potential trends of navigation in the Arctic and the Canadian 
Arctic in particular, outline the occurring legal framework and further touch upon the 
prospective evolution of the Arctic into an area of cooperation or conflict. Based on 
the introduction regarding the legal framework, Chapter III, IV and V will focus in 
particular on the possible legal consistency of UNCLOS, Article 234 and the 
NORDREG regulations and the already occurring jurisdictional baggage of the NWP. 
Hence Chapter III will introduce the international legal framework, dealing with 
UNCLOS, the history of origins of Article 234 and the controversial legal status of the 
NWP. Chapter IV will outline the Canadian legal framework, in particular the Arctic 
Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA)18 and the NORDREG regulations. 
Furthermore Chapter V will analyze the conclusions of both the precedent chapters 
and find an answer to the above-mentioned possible legal applicability. 
                                                        
18 The AWPPA, see AWPPA (R.S.C., 1985, c. A-12), has two key regulations, namely, the Arctic 
Shipping Pollution Prevention Regulations (ASPPR), see ASPPR (C.R.C., c. 353) and the Arctic 
Waters Pollution Prevention Regulations (AWPPR), see AWPPR (C.R.C., c. 354) 
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PART I 
2. Chapter II – The Arctic, trends of navigation and international law 
2.1. The Arctic Marine Area 
The commonly discussed nexus between Arctic shipping and the impacts of climate 
change are to some extent misleading as they transfigure the nature of navigation in 
the Arctic region into a new phenomenon. Shipping in the Arctic waters already exists 
to support hydrocarbon and mineral resource production and the supply of the local, 
largely indigenous, population.19 Yet both the NWP and NSR are tempting for 
international shipping, as the passages would considerably reduce the sailing 
distance between the North Pacific and the North Atlantic.20 The changing climatic 
and environmental circumstances have to be regarded as a triggering effect with 
respect to navigational developments. Increasing regional and coastal marine 
transport and the steady growth of the Arctic marine tourism industry will have a 
lasting, most likely negative, effect on the Arctic marine environment and the 
indigenous population inhabiting the Arctic and its coastal areas and further lead to a 
formative globalization of the area.21 
Both the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) and the IMO recognize 
the Arctic Ocean as one of the five major components of the world ocean.22 Although 
the Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council (Ottawa Declaration)23 
enumerates eight Arctic States24, it is generally accepted that the Arctic Ocean is 
only encompassed by five coastal states, namely Canada, Denmark (in relation to 
Greenland), Norway, the Russian Federation and the United States.25 
For the purpose of this thesis and with due regard to a lacking universally 
accepted definition for the spatial scope of the marine Arctic, Arctic waters will be 
categorized according to the definition of the non-legally binding IMO Guidelines for 
Ships Operating in Polar Waters, paragraph G-3.326 (see Figure1). 
 
                                                        
19 Chircop 2009, p. 355 
20 Moe/Jensen 2010, p. 4 
21 Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment AMSA 2009, p. 8 
22 Ibid., p. 16. However, there is no universally accepted definition for the Arctic Ocean, as it is also 
defined as one of the Mediterranean seas of the Atlantic Ocean, see Tomczak/Godfrey 2001, p. 83 
23 The Declaration on Establishment of the Arctic Council (The Ottawa Declaration) 1996 
24 Canada, Denmark (in relation to Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, 
Sweden and the US 
25 The Ilulissat Declaration 2008 
26 IMO Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar Waters adopted by IMO Assembly Resolution 
A.1024(26), 2 December 2009, p. 7 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Figure 1 – Maximum extent of Arctic waters application 
Source: IMO Guidelines for Ships Operation in Polar Waters 2009, p. 9 
 
2.2. The Canadian Arctic and the Northwest Passage 
The Canadian Arctic Archipelago27, lying north of mainland Canada, covers about 
1.400.000 km2 and consists of 36.563 islands.28 The Archipelago’s various islands, 
e.g. Baffin Island, Victoria Island, Ellesmere Island, are separated by a series of 
channels, which together form the NWP.29 The Canadian Arctic Archipelago’s marine 
area is covered by pack ice for several months of the year, with fundamental 
reductions in the southern and eastern regions due to the above-mentioned impacts 
of global climate change. Yet summer-months ice conditions will continue to vary 
greatly from season to season. 
The NWP is seen as a potential deepwater shortcut for shipping between the 
Atlantic and Pacific Ocean, with minimal usage at present due to heavy multiyear 
                                                        
27 The term “Canadian Arctic Archipelago” refers to the geographical meaning. It is not considered an 
archipelago in a legal sense, as it does not meet the criteria set forth in UNCLOS, Part IV. 
28 The Canadian Encyclopedia 2011 
29 See Annex1 for an overview of the Canadian Territories and its adjacent waters. 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ice.30 A voyage from Seattle to Rotterdam would be shortened by 2.000 nautical 
miles31 (nm) or 25% compared to the current route via the Panama Canal.32 The 
NWP cannot be defined as one single route but a variety of east-west passages33, 
which separate the islands of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago and the Canadian 
mainland. The first complete ship transit was conducted by the Norwegian explorer 
Roald Amundsen from 1903 to 1906. In 1944 the NWP had been navigated for the 
first time in one single season.34 Due to the ice conditions, the operating season only 
lasts from late July to mid-October, depending on the route and year.35 
 
2.3. Current navigation and potential trends of navigation in the Arctic 
Due to the remoteness of the area and its extreme climate conditions (e.g. low 
temperatures, massive ice coverage, extraordinary light conditions, superstructure 
ice and rough water) navigation in the Arctic region is unique compared to any other 
marine area, with the exception of the Antarctica.36 The AMSA differentiates between 
four types of voyages undertaken in the Arctic Ocean: destinational transport, intra-
Arctic transport, trans-Arctic transport and cabotage.37 With regard to the purpose of 
the thesis, all four modes of navigation have to be taken into account. Yet trans-
Arctic shipping is considered the one most prominent in public perception. Using the 
Arctic Ocean as a marine link, trans-Arctic navigation is defined as a full voyage 
between the Pacific and Atlantic Ocean or vice versa.38 In consideration of the 
climatic circumstances, three Arctic routes have the potential to transform 
international shipping, namely the NWP, the NSR and a transpolar Central Arctic 
Ocean route. Annual variations in ice-conditions may change the most suitable route 
on a yearly basis and lead to a combination of all three routes.39 Trans-Arctic 
commercial voyages have been conducted along both the NWP and NSR, mostly 
during the summer season. The NWP has seen the SS Manhattan becoming the first 
                                                        
30 Melling 2002, p. 2 
31 1 nautical mile = 1,852 km 
32 Borgerson 2008, p. 69 
33 For an overview of five water routes of the NWP, including routing, physical description and 
additional information see AMSA 2009, p. 21. Chircop refers to seven principal routes through 
Canadian Arctic waters; see also Chircop 2009, p. 356 
34 Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment AMSA 2009, p. 20 
35 Ibid. 
36 Jensen 2007, p. 2 
37 Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment AMSA 2009, p. 12 
38 Ibid. 
39 Molenaar 2009, p. 292 
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commercial ship to break through the passage in 1969, followed by several 
commercial passenger vessels, e.g. MS Explorer.40 
Compared with the predictions of usage for the NSR and the investments by both 
the Russian Federation and private shipping companies, the NWP is not expected to 
become a viable trans-Arctic route by 2020. The AMSA gives several reasons for this 
assumption: seasonal variability, changing ice conditions, the complexity of the 
routes, chokepoints, depth restrictions, lack of infrastructure and insurance 
limitations.41 
A range of key issues outlines the complexity of trans-Arctic navigation. 
Economic and safety issues comprise among other things the need of specially 
designed polar ships navigating in ice-covered areas, their economic viability, a rise 
of insurance rates due to potential damage to cargoes in extreme cold temperatures 
and the, already-mentioned, insufficient maritime infrastructure.42 
Yet the outlook anticipates a growth in destinational transport in the Canadian 
Arctic due to the increasing demand for seasonal re-supply activities (bulk shipments 
of raw materials), expanding resource developments and tourism.43 
Pollution from vessels is considered among the principal sources of marine 
environment contamination. It entails the discharge of pollutants from routine 
operations (operational pollution, e.g. the intentional discharge of oil) or because of 
vessel accidents (accidental pollution).44 The increase in the various forms of Arctic 
marine transport could further lead to greater potential risks with serious 
environmental consequences, e.g. accidents of oil tankers and the introduction of 
environmental contaminants with severe impacts on the fragile Arctic marine 
biodiversity. Large oil spills are considered to be the largest marine environmental 
threat, with long-lasting and substantial impacts, e.g. the oil spill of the Exxon Valdez 
in southern Alaska in 1989.45 Figure2 illustrates the NWP and NSR, as well as the 
Northeast Passage (NEP).46 
 
                                                        
40 For a comprehensive overview over all NWP-transits from 1903/06 to 2004, see USARC 2004, A-20 
41 Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment AMSA 2009, p. 112 
42 Ibid., p. 103 and 104 
43 Ibid., p. 112 
44 Tan 2006, p. 19 and 20 
45 Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme AMAP 2007, p. 24 
46 AMSA differentiates between the NSR as a set of marine routes from the Kara Gate to the Bering 
Strait, see Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment AMSA 2009, p. 23, and the NEP as the entire set of 
sea routes from northwest Europe along the north coast of Siberia through the Bering Strait to the 
Pacific Ocean, see Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment AMSA 2009, p. 34 
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Figure 2 – The Arctic Marine Area (including NWP and NSR) 
Source: AMSA 2009, p. 17 (Note: the design was slightly changed in comparison to the original) 
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2.4. International law on Arctic shipping – an overview 
The law of the sea is the component of international law with regard to all uses and 
resources of the sea and the fundamental document of modern international ocean 
law. Its cornerstones, accompanying and including customary international law, are 
UNCLOS47, often referred to as the constitution of the oceans, and two 
implementation agreements, the Part XI Deep-Sea Mining Agreement48 and the Fish 
Stocks Agreement49. By recognizing sovereignty, sovereign rights, rights, freedoms 
and obligations, UNCLOS’ overarching objective is to establish a universally 
accepted legal order for the oceans. In this regard it balances the different rights and 
responsibilities of states in their capacities as coastal, port and flag states. 
Supplemented by a number of non-legally binding instruments, UNCLOS also 
accords “competent international organizations” a key-role in the Convention’s 
implementation. The IMO is the United Nations’ “competent organization” with regard 
to the international regulation and coordination of matters concerning maritime 
safety, efficiency of navigation and prevention and control of vessel-source 
pollution.50 The promotion of the highest practicable standards for maritime safety or 
the exchange of information among member states, are only two of the 
comprehensive goals of the UN agency. 
In accordance with the two main IMO treaties, SOLAS 197451 and MARPOL 
1973/7852, several other IMO instruments apply as well in the Arctic region and 
represent a set of international agreements, each addressed to specific challenges: 
COLREG 197253, London Convention 197254, STCW Convention 1978/199555, ISM 
                                                        
47 All the Arctic states are parties to the convention with the exception of the US; see UN Division for 
Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, Oceans and Law of the Sea, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/index.htm 
Accessed 16 June 2011 
48 See Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 
49 See Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 
50 Convention on the International Maritime Organization (IMO), as amended, Geneva, 6 March 1948 
51 See International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, London, 1 November 1974 as amended 
(SOLAS 74) 
52 See International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, London, 2 November 1973, 
as amended (MARPOL 73/78) 
53 See Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, London, 20 
October 1972 
54 See Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 
1972 and its Protocol of 1996 
55 See International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for 
Seafarers, London, 1 December 1978, as amended (STCW 78) 
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Code 199356 or the BWM Convention 200457. Additionally, prompted by the Exxon 
Valdez disaster, the IMO has adopted Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic ice-
covered Waters58 and recently, the above-mentioned Guidelines for Ships Operating 
in Polar Waters, both recommendatory in nature. The PSSA Guidelines59 are 
considered another relevant non-legally binding IMO instrument. The organization is 
currently in the progress of developing a Mandatory Polar Code, with the targeted 
completion in 2012. 
On a regional level several bodies, e.g. the Arctic Council or the OSPAR 
Commission, have the possibility to influence the actions of their member states. Yet 
the Arctic Council does not have the competence to impose legally binding 
obligations on its members or non-members. The OSPAR Commission, whose 
competence in principle does not extend to navigation, has adopted some non-legally 
binding instruments, e.g. in the domain of the BWM Convention.60 However, both 
bodies do not have any enforcement jurisdiction. 
 
2.5. The Arctic region: an area of cooperation or conflict? 
During the last decade the Arctic region has captured the attention and interests of 
policymakers, which resulted in an intensified political and economic orientation 
towards one of the earth’s most remote areas. The region outpaced itself as an 
epiphenomenon of international politics and turned into a dynamic, uncertain political, 
legal and economic environment. Arctic coastal states share similar interests and 
extensively express their notion of sovereignty. Non-Arctic states urge to obtain their 
legal right to a say, as parts of the Arctic Ocean are high seas.61 Oversimplifications 
of complex multidimensional issues with regard to unresolved Arctic maritime 
                                                        
56 See The International Safety Management Code, IMO Assembly Resolution A.741(18), 1993 
57 See International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships Ballast Water and 
Sediments, London, 13 February 2004 
58 See IMO Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic ice-covered Waters adopted by IMO 
MSC/Circ.1056, MEPC/Circ.399, 23 December 2002 
59 See Revised Guidelines for the Identification and Designation of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas, 
IMO Assembly Resolution A.982(24), 2005 
60 In that regard the OSPAR Commission has adopted voluntary guidelines to reduce the risk of non-
indigenous species invasion through ballast water, see OSPAR Commission General Guidance on the 
Voluntary Interim Application of the D1 Ballast Water Exchange Standard by vessels leaving the Baltic 
Sea and transiting through the North-East Atlantic to other destinations, Agreement 2009-05, 
Brussels, 2009 
61 Both China and Japan are increasing their activities in the Arctic, see Huebert 2008, p. 15 
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boundaries and the race for hydrocarbon resources interlinked with sovereignty 
issues, tend to visualize the Arctic as a region of conflict rather than cooperation.62 
Arguments are built bi-directional in favour and against a comprehensive, legally 
binding Arctic treaty. By now the international legal agenda is set by the law of the 
sea and its combination between UNCLOS and customary international law. 
Multilateral cooperation can lead to mutually desirable outcomes for states involved. 
International law can be considered the framework for international cooperation in all 
respects. Yet no state is bound to meet the legal requirements imposed by 
international law and elaborated by the international community. 
Nevertheless, the realistic preference of a unilateral decision-making process by 
sovereign nations can be revised to reach and protect objectives set. Self-interested 
actors, e.g. sovereign nations rationally forgo independent decision-making and 
develop processes for multilateral regulations in case of dilemmas of common 
interests or common aversions.63 
This specified realistic approach of dual messaging becomes explicit when 
analyzing Canada’s complex position on Arctic issues: emphasizing sovereignty, 
national security and national interests, as well as international cooperation and 
stewardship.64 
The proposed scope of this thesis with the explicit example of the NORDREG 
regulations and its international legal applicability will outline one specific illustration 
of Canada’s Arctic perspective, cooperating or confronting with other international 
actors. Three famous occasions, fighting to balance coastal state rights with 
navigational and marine use interests, have made Canada known as “rocker of the 
boat”65: 
• the enactment of the AWPPA in 1970, 
• the establishment of straight baselines around the Arctic Archipelago after the 
NWP-transit of the USCGC Polar Sea and 
• the Estai incident, when Canada unilaterally “took-on” foreign overfishing 
beyond its 200 nm fishing zone.66 
                                                        
62 For a comprehensive up-to-date analysis concerning the opportunities of cooperation and 
possibilities of conflict in the Arctic, see Brosnan/Leschine/ Miles 2011 
63 Stein 1982, p. 324. The framework of “common interest” and “common aversion” is described by 
Stein, see also Stein 1990 
64 Lackenbauer 2011, p. 4 
65 VanderZwaag 2000, p. 209 
66 Ibid. 
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These three examples illustrate Canada’s possible unilateral course of action against 
the background of domestic pressure and considerations regarding sovereignty 
issues. Canada’s on-going dilemma in the Canadian Arctic can be defined on how to 
balance sovereignty, security and stewardship as to protect national interests, 
promote sustainable development and facilitates circumpolar stability and 
cooperation.67 
 
3. Chapter III – International Legal Framework 
3.1. Introduction 
A perceived international need of change in the law of the seas led to the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), a set of complex 
multinational negotiations which lasted from 1973 until 1982. Canada signed the 
Convention in 1982 and became a party by accession in 2003. The US has asserted 
that most of UNCLOS represents customary international law, in particular rights of 
navigation and overflight,68 but has not signed the Convention yet. This has to be 
considered an important fact in the relationship between the two states as the 
UNCLOS dispute settlement process would not be a legal option in case of 
disagreement. Furthermore an assertion by the US of an UNCLOS provision does 
not ipso facto make Canada to accept this assertion.69 
 
3.2. UNCLOS and its Article 234 
The special regime of Article 234, often referred to as the “Arctic exception clause”, 
was directly negotiated by the states concerned, namely Canada, the US and the 
Soviet Union, and incorporated within the Convention without opposition.70 The 
Article recognizes the right of coastal states to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory 
pollution prevention laws and regulations in ice-covered areas, that can be more 
stringent than generally accepted international rules and standards (GAIRAS) 
established under the auspices of the IMO71. This includes stricter discharge and 
safety standards, as well as standards for construction, design, equipment and 
manning (CDEM standards). No analogous provision for any other marine area is to 
                                                        
67 Lackenbauer 2011, p. 4 
68 See President Ronald Reagan Statement on United States Oceans Policy, March 10, 1983 
69 McDorman 2009, p. 25 
70 UNCLOS 1982: a commentary, Volume IV 1991, p. 393 
71 With regard to manning standards or radioactive cargo the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), respectively are the responsible organizations. 
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be found within UNCLOS.72 Article 234 is considered a major exception to the limited 
coastal state’s jurisdiction over vessel-source pollution. The Article reads as follows: 
 
“Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws 
and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution 
from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic 
zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice 
covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional 
hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could cause 
major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. Such 
laws and regulations shall have due regard to navigation and the protection 
and preservation of the marine environment based on the best available 
scientific evidence.”73 
 
Its general objective is to balance the interests of the coastal state in the specified 
ice-covered area with the general interest of international navigation, stated in the 
“due regard to navigation” reference.74 Additionally, Article 236 on Sovereign 
immunity applies with regard to Article 234 as provisions regarding the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment do not apply to any warship or non-
governmental vessel.75 
The initiative of Canada to develop a special regime for ice-covered areas is 
heavily interlinked with the NWP-transit of the SS Manhattan in 1969. The voyage of 
the US registered oil tanker was the starting point for Canadian officials to create a 
specific nuanced and functional approach to the Canadian Arctic waters.76 Based on 
the country’s limited capacities, Canada initially supports limited initiatives with the 
potential to expand them to valid solutions by including international acceptance in 
the future.77 The exercised offshore authority should only answer the purpose of the 
specified functional goals and not interfere with ocean activities unrelated to national 
jurisdiction, pollution control and fisheries. The AWPPA was the consequent result of 
                                                        
72 VanderZwaag/Chircop 2008, p. 9 
73 UNCLOS, Article 234 
74 UNCLOS 1982: a commentary, Volume IV 1991, p. 393 
75 UNCLOS, Article 236, see also UNCLOS 1982: a commentary, Volume IV 1991, p. 396 and 417. 
Yet several commentators question this strict interpretation, see also Legal aspects of Arctic shipping. 
Summary report 2010, p. 13 
76 McRae 1987, p. 100 
77 Huebert 2001, p. 251; McRae describes the approach as both radical (creating a rethinking of the 
traditional doctrine of the law of the sea at that time) and novel (environmental considerations were put 
in the forefront), see McRae 1987, p. 101 
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this new approach and consideration78, but needed a forum and/or regime to be 
legally valid. In this regard the negotiation and later implementation of Article 234 can 
be considered a major achievement of Canadian foreign policy.79 Yet it seems 
difficult to recapitulate the exact negotiation-process between the three Arctic littoral 
states directly involved80. One view is that the US would allow unilaterally adopted 
coastal state environmental provisions for ice-covered areas in exchange for the 
Canadian acquiescence to the international straits regime of UNCLOS, with the 
Soviet Union benefiting from both positions.81 The special regime of Article 234 is 
largely perceived as a highly specialized provision that served as a side-deal 
necessary for the acceptance of UNCLOS.82 The different interests of Canada and 
the US with regard to Article 234, including the legal status of the NWP, will be 
discussed at a later point of this chapter. 
The implementation and interpretation of Article 234 depends heavily on current 
and future state practice. By now only Canada and the Russian Federation83 have 
adopted national legislation based on Article 234.84 The practices of the Russian 
Federation and the US are of considerable interest as both states are considered to 
be great powers with regard to their status as maritime states and their navigational 
interests. Yet it has to be pointed out that any discussion related to Article 234 has to 
keep the unilateral maxim of the provision and the consequently ambiguous 
relationship between the states entitled to invoke Article 234 and the IMO in mind. On 
the one hand, Arctic coastal states are legally positioned to develop and enforce 
appropriate rules, based on Article 234. The Article does not require any conformity 
of CDEM standards with GAIRAS.85 On the other hand, the IMO is considered the 
only “competent international organization”, which can adopt global rules and 
standards for navigation.86 In this respect the inevitable international character of 
shipping influences the correlation between the IMO on the one hand and Article 234, 
                                                        
78 The AWPPA will be discussed into detail in Chapter 4.1. 
79 McRae 1987, p. 110 
80 Bartenstein points out the concern of deliberate or accidental vessel source oil pollution as the main 
reason for the three states involved to negotiate Article 234, see Bartenstein 2011, p. 24 
81 Brubaker 2005, p. 44 
82 Huebert 2001, p. 249 
83 See the analysis by Brubaker 2005 with respect to the compatibility of Russian state practice with 
Article 234. For a detailed analysis regarding the legal regime of navigation in the Russian Arctic, see 
Franckx 2009 
84 Additionally, Brubaker notes that Norway (in relation to Svalbard) has adopted provisions along the 
lines of the ISM Code by implementing Article 234 elements, see Brubaker 2010, p. 9 
85 Yet the envisaged regulation must have “due regard to navigation”, see Churchill/Lowe 1999, p. 348 
86 Chircop 2010, p. 181 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and the special enforcement measures for coastal states hereunder, on the other 
hand. 
In addition, two main remarks have to be offered with respect to Article 234 and 
the relationship between Canada and the US. Firstly, does the US, as a non-party to 
UNCLOS, accept the provision as a part of customary international law?87 Secondly, 
will the US recognize Canada’s Arctic waters legislation as jurisdiction permitted by 
Article 234, in case of an above acceptance? 
The US could further argue that Article 234 is not applicable, and instead the 
traditional marine environmental regime, in the present case Article 211, 218-220 and 
customary international law, would apply.88 
 
3.3. The equivocal meaning of Article 234 
The ambiguity of the text, due to the different interests of the involved Arctic coastal 
states, poses an interpretive problem with regard to coastal state prescriptive and 
enforcement jurisdiction in ice-covered areas. The broad privileges, stipulated in the 
Article, are subject to several restrictions and limited to a special purpose with an 
either expansive or limited scope of interpretation and further application. The legal 
interpretation89 of Article 234 includes the following terms: “where”, “non-
discriminatory laws”, “due regard to navigation”, “within the limits of the exclusive 
economic zone” (EEZ) and “environmental protection based on the best available 
scientific evidence”.90 Bartenstein divides the conditions for the application of Article 
234, in a similar way, into three types: a territorial, a temporal and a material scope of 
the provision.91 
This section will outline the various forms of interpretation of the introduced 
terms. Due to the limited scope of the thesis, the interpretation cannot be conducted 
in its entirety. Nevertheless it will provide the basis for the further discussion 
regarding the legal applicability of NORDREG based on Article 234 and its need to 
be a law or regulation for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution 
from vessels in ice-covered areas (research question No. 1). 
                                                        
87 Pharand argued in favour of acceptance of Article 234 being customary international law, see 
Pharand 1980, p. 465 and 466. Hoyle also indicates the Article reflecting existing international law, 
see Hoyle 1983, p. 135 
88 Brubaker 2005, p. 45 
89 For a comprehensive up-to-date analysis of Article 234, see Bartenstein 2011 
90 Brubaker 2005, p. 54. Regarding the interpretation of “non discriminatory laws”, see also Brubaker 
2005, p. 55 and 56 
91 Bartenstein 2011, p. 28. The material scope comprises the relationship between Article 234 and 
Article 236 and was commented on in Chapter 3.2 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In comparison to other UNCLOS Articles, e.g. Article 211, paragraph 5, Article 234 
does not mention the pre-approval by the “competent international organization” as a 
precondition to adopt laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control 
of marine pollution from vessels. The absence of this reference strengthens the 
interpretation of a greater unilateral coastal state prescriptive jurisdiction over specific 
ice-covered areas than determined by GAIRAS through the IMO.92 The deficiency of 
an international review process under the auspices of the IMO is considered one of 
the few certitudes of Article 234 and was strongly opposed by the US and other 
maritime powers during the early years of the negotiation process.93 
 
 “where” to “when”? 
McRae and Goundrey define the meaning of the term “where” as the key to the 
interpretation of Article 234, offering both a restrictive (narrow) and broad 
interpretation of the Article.94 
A restrictive interpretation would render the spatial meaning of “where” into the 
temporal meaning of “when”. Only in the case (“when”) of severe climatic conditions, 
including the presence of sea ice for most of the year, with the possibility of creating 
exceptional hazards to navigation, which could lead to major harm of the ecological 
balance, a coastal state has the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws 
and regulations on the basis of Article 234. This narrow interpretation indicates that a 
coastal state can only rely on Article 234 if the above-mentioned necessary 
conditions prevail.95 Furthermore, laws or regulations based on Article 234 have to be 
designed specifically in order to deal with the severe climatic conditions arising.96 
The broader interpretation97 highlights the spatial meaning of “where” by outlining 
the geographical area to which Article 234 applies. This more literal form of 
interpretation renders the reference to the various conditions redundant and 
essentially repetitive as a simply specification of the area as one covered by ice for 
most of the year would have been enough.98 
                                                        
92 Brubaker 2005, p. 54 
93 Bartenstein 2011, p. 37 
94 McRae/Goundrey 1982, p. 216-222 
95 Bartenstein 2011, p. 30 
96 McRae/Goundrey 1982, p. 219 
97 Implicit support for the broad interpretation is drawn by McRae and Goundrey by comparing the 
wording and limitations of Article 211, paragraph 6 and Article 234, see also McRae/Goundrey 1982, 
p. 218 
98 Ibid., p. 217 
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Two further obstacles with regard to an adequate interpretation are already found in 
the travaux préparatoires: a missing definition of “ice” and “ice-covered areas” and 
the absence of published material to explain the expression “most of the year”.99 
Conditions in temperature and the thickness of sea ice vary from year to year, 
making an exact predictability impossible. Based on these changing natural 
conditions the practical application of a restrictive interpretation seems to be less 
attractive.100 
Both Canada’s and the Russian Federation’s practice indicate a broad 
interpretation. The position of the US seems to be unclear, although a restrictive 
interpretation would evidently strengthen the position of a flag state. 101 
 
Based on the analysis of the interpretation’s practical attraction it seems essential to 
briefly examine the terms “due regard to navigation102” and “within the limits of the 
exclusive economic zone”. With regard to the two terms and a combined 
examination, two possibilities and again a narrower and broader interpretation, 
respectively, seem evident. Brubaker concludes that despite an applicable limitation 
of Article 234 to the EEZ, a coastal state could not exercise greater rights in the EEZ 
than in the territorial sea.103 The crucial question occurring, in particular with regard 
to the NWP, concerns the possible application of Article 234 to the territorial sea and 
international straits (within the territorial sea).104 Article 55 defines the EEZ as an 
area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea.105 The broad interpretation would 
decode the term “limits” only to the outer limits of the EEZ106, implicitly ignoring 
Articles 3, 4 and 55. Yet this argumentation would give coastal states the 
argumentative opportunity to adopt more stringent measures than allowed for by the 
regimes of innocent107 and transit passage108 and could strengthen an environmental 
protection-related argumentation.109 This teleological argumentation is held by 
                                                        
99 UNCLOS 1982: a commentary, Volume IV 1991, p. 397 
100 Bartenstein 2011, p. 31 
101 Brubaker 2005, p. 55 
102 For an up-to-date examination of the due regard clause, see Bartenstein 2011, p. 41-45 
103 Brubaker 2005, p. 57 
104 Coastal states enjoy full sovereignty over their internal waters; see Churchill/Lowe 1999, p. 61. Due 
to this legal precondition coastal states do not need to rely on Article 234 regarding its jurisdictional 
authority in this area. 
105 UNCLOS, Article 55 
106 Article 57 indicates a 200nm maximum extension of the EEZ, measured from the coastal state’s 
baselines, see UNCLOS, Article 57 
107 UNCLOS, Article 17-26 and 45 
108 UNCLOS, Article 37-44 
109 Bartenstein 2011, p. 29 
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Pharand110 and conclusively contended by McRae and Goundrey111, who support a 
literal interpretation, recognizing the inner and outer limits of the EEZ. 
The balance between the interests of a coastal state and the general interests of 
international navigation and flag states, respectively, is legally outlined in the due 
regard clause as any specific kind of reference to prescription or standard-setting is 
lacking. Furthermore, the term “due regard to navigation” has to be considered with 
respect to the above-mentioned “where-when” terminology. It dictates that any law or 
regulation based on Article 234 is only permitted where and when necessary.112 
Yet the Article’s due regard clause could imply a sui generis meaning in the 
context of Article 234, as suggested by Bartenstein.113 This unique characterization 
entails that “due regard to navigation” does not refer to the navigational rights 
regimes, e.g. innocent passage, transit passage, in UNCLOS. Furthermore the 
traditional “due regard to navigation” balance between coastal state interests (→ 
environmental considerations) and flag state interests (→ navigational 
considerations) would be superseded by the sui generis connotation and a relatively 
greater weight to environmental considerations.114 However, this characterization 
implicitly excludes a broader interpretation of the term. A coastal state cannot apply 
Article 234 if only a limited correlation to environmental concerns is considered. 
The purpose of Article 234 is to authorize Arctic coastal states to prescribe and 
enforce special laws and regulations, subject to certain restrictions with regard to a 
specific geographical area. It could be argued that the sui generis meaning, including 
stronger coastal state rights, implicitly broadens the interpretable gist of the phrase 
“within the limits of the [EEZ]”, strengthens the environmental considerations and 
would consistently allow the coastal state to apply special measures within the full 
200nm from the measured baselines, including the territorial sea and international 
straits.115 
The measures a coastal state can actually adopt are heavily linked to the 
phrases “due regard to navigation” and “on the best available scientific evidence”. 
Despite the sui generis characterization of “due regard to navigation”, the coastal 
states’ interests, expressed by a law or regulation based on Article 234, have to be 
                                                        
110 Pharand 2007, p. 47. According to Churchill and Lowe the term “within the limits of the EEZ” seems 
to include the territorial sea as well, see Churchill/Lowe 1999, p. 348 
111 McRae/Goundrey 1982, p. 221 
112 Molenaar 1998, p. 420 
113 Bartenstein 2011, p. 45 
114 Ibid. 
115 Brubaker 2005, p. 57 
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based upon adequate scientific knowledge of the Arctic marine area and its 
environment, indicating a valid relationship between the measures adopted and the 
conditions in the specified region occurring. In that regard a competent international 
organization, e.g. the Arctic Council or the International Arctic Science Committee 
(IASC), could act as an international forum of communication and scientific 
exchange. The term indicates an implicit contribution of the international community 
with regard to the enactment of laws and regulation based on Article 234. On the 
other hand, the broad meaning of the term “best available scientific evidence” points 
toward a dynamic interpretation of the coastal state’s possibility to apply a 
precautionary approach116 in order to justify its legal measures.117 This kind of 
interpretation further indicates that regulations based on Article 234 do not 
necessarily have to be bound to the CDEM character of the AWPPA, which gave rise 
to the Article. It can be argued that a contemporary understanding of the provision 
could additionally include vessel traffic systems. 
In summary, great emphasis has to be laid upon the interpretative ambiguity of 
Article 234 and the uncertainties regarding the specific rights of coastal states. The 
interpretative problem concerning the application of Article 234 to international straits 
will be covered in the next chapter in the context of the jurisdictional baggage of the 
NWP. 
                                                        
116 Although the legal status of the precautionary approach/principle remains an open question, 
several commentators consider it a principle of customary international law; see Trouwborst 2007 
117 Brubaker 2005, p. 58 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3.4. Internal waters vs. international strait: the jurisdictional baggage of 
NORDREG 
3.4.1. Introduction 
As will be outlined later in the thesis, the NORDREG regulations apply to all 
Canadian Arctic waters and consequently cover the above-mentioned various routes 
of the NWP. The following subchapter will introduce the jurisdictional baggage of the 
NWP118 and the legal debate, mostly between Canada and the US, concerning the 
status of the passage under international law. In this respect the subsequent 
considerations will be addressed: are the waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago 
internal waters, based on the claim of an historic title (→ historic waters) and the 
establishment of straight baselines? If the waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago 
are not internal waters, is the NWP an international strait and if not, subject to the 
right of innocent passage? The last question relates to the legal relationship between 
the status of the NWP and Article 234. 
The Canadian Arctic is of vital interest for the country and represents an 
important part of Canada’s national identity. However, Canada’s basis to sovereignty 
in the region is a multifaceted issue, with strategic, economic, security and 
environmental value. Canada has not yet presented a submission to the Commission 
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf with regard to the Arctic Ocean. Notably the US 
and member states of European Union (EU) contest the Canadian claims regarding 
the waters surrounding the Canadian Arctic Archipelago.119 
The US’ interests in the Arctic region are aimed at energy independence, e.g. the 
exploitation of hydrocarbon resources, and the notion of the freedom of the seas and 
strategic mobility as cornerstones of US foreign policy.120 A successful unilateral 
approach of Canada could influence other waterways, to the detriment of US 
interests. The EU, whose member states collectively own the world’s largest 
merchant fleet, wants to gradually improve Arctic commercial navigation and is intent 
on defending its navigational rights.121 
                                                        
118 For a detailed analysis regarding the legal status of the NWP, see Pharand 2007 
119 Huebert further articulates a possible reservation about the Canadian claim by Japan, see Huebert 
2003, p. 305 
120 Byers 2010, p. 78 
121 Legal aspects of Arctic shipping. Summary report 2010, p. 5 
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The 1988 Arctic Cooperation Agreement122 defines today’s relationship between 
Canada and the US with respect to their Arctic waters. Both states affirm that they 
“agree to disagree” on the status of the NWP under applicable international law. It 
demonstrates the capacity and willingness to pragmatically overlook legal disputes 
and collaborate in functional terms. In this case Canada respects US icebreaker 
vessel traffic through the NWP while both states maintain their position on the 
international legal status of the passage.123 
 
3.4.2. Internal waters (historic title and straight baselines) 
There is no disagreement that the waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago and the 
NWP, respectively, are under Canadian jurisdiction. The dispute on hand arises from 
the strict legal status of the concerned waters. Does a foreign vessel have a 
navigational right (innocent or transit passage) or can Canada require vessels to 
obtain permission to utilize the waters?124 
 
The following initial points summarize the complex dispute: 
Canada considers the NWP as part of its internal waters125. This claim is 
based on two positions. First, the waters are internal by virtue of an historic title (→ 
historic waters). Second, the waters are internal on grounds of straight baselines 
drawn around the Canadian Arctic Archipelago (→ straight baseline claim). Thus the 
legal consequences with regard to navigational rights would preclude the right of 
innocent passage by reason of the historic title. However, innocent passage would be 
legally ensured resting upon Article 8, if only the second line of argumentation would 
be legally considered. This Article stipulates a continuous right of innocent passage 
within internal waters that were enclosed by straight baselines and have not been 
previously considered internal.126 
Other states, e.g. US, and member states of the EU hold the view that the 
waters of the NWP are not internal but rather form an international strait.127 In that 
                                                        
122 Canada and United States of America. Agreement on Arctic Cooperation. Signed at Ottawa on 11 
January 1988 
123 McDorman 2009, p. 3 
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territorial sea is measured, see UNCLOS, Article 8 
126 UNCLOS, Article 8, para. 2 
127 In its updated Arctic Region Policy the US clearly state that the NWP is a strait used for 
international navigation, see United States, The White House 2009 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case, states could enjoy the right of transit passage, resting upon Article 37 and 38, if 
the waters concerned qualify as an international strait. 
 
 Historic waters 
The concept of historic waters is considered to be a regime that constitutes an 
exception to the general rules of law128, with neither UNCLOS nor the 1958 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (TSC)129 offering a 
profound explanation.130 
According to the definition by the ICJ, stated in the Fisheries case (United 
Kingdom vs. Norway), “historic waters” are “usually meant waters which are treated 
as internal waters but which would not have that character were it not for the 
existence of an historic title”.131 A 1962 study on the Juridical Regime of Historic 
Waters, including Historic Bays, requested by the International Law Commission 
(ILC), concluded that the legal status of historic waters either being considered as 
internal waters or parts of the territorial sea, would depend on the sovereignty 
exercised over the specified area by the claiming state.132 
The study further determines three basis requirements for the existence of an 
historic title. These three factors are an exclusive exercise of state jurisdiction, the 
continuity of such exercise and the acquiescence of foreign states.133 In accordance 
with these requirements134, Bouchez defines historic waters as “waters over which 
the coastal State, contrary to the generally applicable rules of international law, 
clearly, effectively, continuously, and over a substantial period of time, exercises 
sovereign rights with the acquiescence of the community of States.”135 
The Canadian claim was for the first time clearly expressed in 1973 by a 
statement of the Bureau of Legal Affairs. It stipulates “that the waters of the Canadian 
Arctic Archipelago are internal waters of Canada, on an historical basis, although 
they have not been declared as such in any treaty or by any legislation.”136 It further 
states that Canada has similar historic claims to the waters of the Gulf of St. 
                                                        
128 Pharand 1971, p. 2 
129 See Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Geneva, 29 April 1958 
130 For a comprehensive overview regarding historic waters, see Symmons 2008 
131 Fisheries case, Judgment of December 18th, I95I: ICJ Reports 1951, p. 130 
132 International Law Commission (ILC) Yearbook, Vol. II, 1962, p. 25 
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Lawrence, the Bay of Fundy, Dixon Entrance, Hecate Strait and Queen Charlotte 
Sound.137 
Several commentators conclude that the Canadian historic internal waters claim 
is rather weak with an implausibility to meet the necessary requirements.138 The 
Arctic state is not in a position to lift the burden of proof with regard to the exclusive 
exercise of state jurisdiction and the acquiescence of foreign states. Neither could it 
succeed in subjecting all foreign ships to prior authorization before entering the NWP 
nor did other states acquiesce in the Canadian claim.139 
The missing international acceptance is clearly evident with regard to the claim 
that the waters are internal on grounds of straight baselines drawn around the 
Canadian Arctic Archipelago and consequent international protest. Both the historic 
internal water claim and the straight baseline claim can be considered separately or 
in addition to each other. 
 
 Straight baselines 
The concept of straight baselines was developed in context of the Norwegian 
baselines claim (→ skjærgaard), legally recognized in the ICJ Fisheries case and 
consequently adopted within TSC, Article 4 and UNCLOS, Article 7.140 Three basic 
criteria are considered necessary in the present case law and mentioned treaty law: 
a) the general direction of the coast, b) the relationship between sea and land 
formations and c) particular economic interests evidenced by long usage.141 
Provoked by the NWP-transit of the USCGC Polar Sea, the Canadian 
government adopted further measures to strengthen its historic internal waters claim. 
The instantaneous, but legally controversial establishment of straight baselines142 
around the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, already mentioned as one of the three 
“rocker of the boat” occasions, was the most restrictive instrument. On 10 September 
1985, Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs at that time, announced that 
the Canadian government, based on an Order in Council, established straight 
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the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its 
immediate vicinity, the method of straight baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in 
drawing the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.” 
141 See Fisheries case, Judgment of December 18th, I95I: ICJ Reports 1951, p. 133; TSC, Article 4 and 
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baselines around the outer perimeter of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, which 
define the outer limit of Canada’s “historical internal waters”. Furthermore Canada’s 
territorial waters should extend 12 nm seaward of these baselines.143 Yet Canada 
was neither a party to TSC or UNCLOS and therefore based its claim on customary 
international law, recognized in the ICJ’s Fisheries case. 
The explicit reference to “historical internal waters” substantiated the historic title 
claim and was asserted despite protests by the US and the member states of the 
European Community (EC)144, with none taking the opportunity to take the matter to 
the ICJ. 
In comparison with the historic internal waters claim, Canada’s baseline position 
has strong legal arguments under international law. Straight baselines may be drawn 
“in localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into” or where “there is a 
fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity”.145 Further “the drawing of 
straight baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent from the general 
direction of the coast, and the sea areas lying within the lines must be sufficiently 
closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters”.146 In 
his comprehensive analysis, Pharand considers the necessary criteria as met, 
including several other considerations: the length of straight baselines, the 
consolidation of title for certain straight baselines by the exercise of state authority, 
long usage and general international toleration.147 Consequently, Pharand concluded 
that the Canadian Arctic Archipelago qualifies for the usage of straight baselines 
under customary international law. Accordingly, the enclosed waters meet the 
requirement to have the status of internal waters.148 
In summary, it can be stated that the Canadian historic internal waters claim is 
not legally sustainable and a preclusion of innocent passage to this effect not 
possible. However, the legal grounds with regard to the establishment of straight 
baselines and an inclusion of the waters enclosed as internal waters are deemed to 
be adequate. Based on UNCLOS, Article 8, paragraph 2 the right of innocent 
passage in these waters still remains. Yet Canada was not a state party to UNCLOS 
when adopting straight baselines in 1985. The Arctic state acted under customary 
                                                        
143 The Canadian Yearbook of International Law (CYIL) 1986, p. 418 
144 United States Department of State (Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and 
Scientific Affairs) 1992, p. 29 and 30 
145 UNCLOS, Article 7, paragraph 1 
146 UNCLOS, Article 7, paragraph 3 
147 Pharand 2007, p. 17-28 
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international law. Does this circumstance decisively affect the apparent right of 
innocent passage? 
Both Pharand and McRae strongly argue that the applicable treaty provisions do 
not bind Canada.149 Pharand breaks the discussion down to a differentiation between 
the existence of a right of innocent passage before and after 1985. Prior to the 
establishment of straight baselines, regardless of their legal applicability, two areas of 
territorial waters existed in the NWP.150 The existence of a right of innocent passage 
through the territorial sea is closely interlinked to the notion of territorial sea, with 
both concepts developing in parallel.151 Furthermore, the rule of innocent passage 
was an accepted state practice prior to the implementation of the TSC and 
UNCLOS.152 With regard to international straits, the ICJ recognized in the Corfu 
Channel case that in accordance with international custom, warships (and a fortiori 
merchant ships) have a right of innocent passage through these waters.153 Following 
this decision, the right of innocent passage was generally accepted as part of 
customary international law before 1985. 
Before Canada’s straight baselines claim, the waters of the NWP consisted of 
territorial waters and high seas. Based on the above facts and stipulated in TSC, 
Article 14 and UNCLOS, Article 17 it seems evident that a right of innocent passage 
has developed over time and existed within the territorial waters of the NWP prior to 
1985. According to UNCLOS, Article 25, Canada could have temporarily suspended 
the right of innocent passage for the protection of its security.154 
This clear conclusion falls apart when considering the legal situation after the 
Canadian claim. The Fisheries case does not indicate the existence of a right of 
innocent passage in waters enclosed by straight baselines. Only the TSC and 
UNCLOS consequently provided the additional clause, recognizing a continuously 
existing innocent passage in waters, which are internal due to the establishment of 
straight baselines but have been considered territorial or high seas before.155 
According to Pharand the enclosed waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago would 
be subjected to the right of innocent passage if drawn under the TSC but not if drawn 
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under customary international law by virtue of the Fisheries case.156 It is further 
argued that TSC, Article 5, paragraph 2 has not become part of customary 
international law in 1985 due to lacking state practice and that the enclosed waters 
had already acquired the status of internal waters at the Canadian accession to 
UNCLOS in 2003.157 Hence the new treaty-law rules, displayed in both conventions, 
do not have any legal impact on Canada’s claimed internal waters. 
However, Franckx contests this legal reasoning by referring to Article 309, which 
stipulates that UNCLOS allows for no reservations or exceptions, unless expressly 
permitted by other articles.158 Consequently, Canada is obliged to accept the content 
of Article 8, exactly as it is worded, since it ratified the Convention in 2003.159 
 
Yet if the NWP is considered an international strait, each state, according to 
UNCLOS, Article 38, enjoys the right of transit passage through straits, which are 
used for international navigation. Hence the following question has to be posed: can 
the NWP be regarded an international strait? 
 
3.4.3. International straits 
The term “strait” is neither defined in TSC nor in UNCLOS. The rights of coastal and 
flag states are not determined by any explicit definition of “strait”, but rather by the 
legal status of the waters constituting the strait.160 Although a legal regime for “straits 
used for international navigation” was agreed on during UNCLOS III, the actual 
definition is part of customary international law and can be found in the Corfu 
Channel case. Concerning this matter, the ICJ distinguished between two crucial 
criteria, a geographical and a functional one, in order to characterize a strait used for 
international navigation. Yet the court held that “the decisive criterion is (…) its 
geographical situation as connecting two parts of the high seas and the fact of its 
being used for international navigation.”161 Churchill and Lowe suggest that the Corfu 
Channel’s secondary importance as a sea route and the actual volume of traffic are 
irrelevant to the right of passage through it.162 By contrast, Pharand holds the opinion 
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that according to the coordinative conjunction “ainsi que” (as well as) in the French 
text, the two criteria are of equal importance.163 
It is undisputed that the NWP meets the geographic criteria articulated in the 
Corfu Channel case and stipulated in Article 37164 as it undoubtedly connects two 
parts of the high seas and EEZ, respectively by linking the Atlantic and Pacific 
Oceans. The controversial issue between Canada and in particular the US is outlined 
in the interpretation of the functional phrase “being used for international navigation” 
if one considers a debatably equality of both criteria. Does the wording indicate the 
necessity of actual international maritime traffic use (Canada’s notion) or a potential 
use (US’ notion)? 
Koh argues that both the geographical and functional requirement must be 
met.165 The functional condition, laid down in Article 37 and borrowed from TSC, 
Article 16, paragraph 4, has yet not been the subject of any authoritative 
interpretation. In that case, the judgement in the Corfu Channel case still has to be 
recalled.166 It emphasizes the actual usage requirement but simultaneously neglects 
the necessity of specifying a certain volume of traffic.167 
The ICJ held the view that the Corfu Channel was already a useful route for 
international maritime traffic by indicating 2.884 vessels passing the Channel within 
nine months.168 In his recent comprehensive study, Pharand takes a different view of 
the functional criteria and concludes that the volume indication is necessary when 
interpreting the functional requirement and determining the actual usage. 
Accordingly, a strait may only be considered international if it already has a history as 
a useful route for international maritime traffic.169 The NWP would therefore fail to be 
a strait used for international navigation.170 In this case, only a ruling through a 
competent international legal court (e.g. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(ITLOS), ICJ) or a binding agreement among the interested states could reach legal 
certainty. 
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In summary, commentators stated that the NWP does not qualify as an international 
strait based on the circumstances today. Yet an internationalization of the passage, 
due to the possibility of an increase of foreign commercial navigation in the Arctic 
region, could create the legal right of transit passage171. “A pattern of international 
shipping across the Passage, developed over relatively few years, might be 
considered sufficient to make it international.”172 Yet ships and aircrafts in transit 
would be bound by the legal obligations provided under UNCLOS Articles 39, 40 and 
41. Canada’s right to protect the waters of a possible international strait are 
stipulated in UNCLOS Articles 42, 233 and 234. 
 
3.4.4. Applicability of Article 234 in a strait used for international 
navigation 
Another debatably issue is considered in the legal applicability of Article 234 in straits 
used for international navigation. Neither does Article 234 address the possibility of 
straits (subject to transit passage) lying completely or partly within ice-covered 
areas173 nor does UNCLOS give any guidance whether the regime of transit passage 
trumps the regime of Article 234 or vice versa.174 As already outlined above, Article 
234 is included in a special section by itself (Part XII, Section 8, ice-covered areas). If 
read in the context with Article 233, which provides that “nothing in sections 5, 6 and 
7 affects the legal regime of straits used for international navigation”175, it can be 
argued that section 8 (and Article 234) should have been added to these stipulations, 
if it would have been the intention to apply the legal regime of straits used for 
international navigation to those within ice-covered areas.176 As annotated in the 
travaux préparatoires, Article 233 does not apply to section 8 by its terms.177 Based 
on the missing reference of Article 234 in the other sections of Part XII McRae further 
concluded that the international straits regime is not applicable to the NWP.178 
According to Pharand, Article 234 would continue to apply even if the NWP became 
an international strait.179  
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Due to the missing exemption of straits from the application of Article 234, the 
controversial questions of interpretation, indicated in Chapter 3.3, would equally 
rise.180 Considering the above outlined broad and narrow interpretations of Article 
234, it would be irrelevant under the broad interpretation if the waters of the NWP 
would constitute an international strait or not.181 The narrow interpretation indicates 
that a coastal state can only rely on Article 234 if the necessary conditions (severe 
climatic conditions, the presence of ice, etc.) prevail. If regulations enacted to prevent 
marine pollution, do not result from these conditions, the normal rules, e.g. based on 
Article 211, applicable to the EEZ, including where appropriate to international straits, 
would apply.182 If these internationally agreed rules and standards to prevent, reduce 
and control pollution of the marine environment from vessels would be inconsistent 
with the protection of the fragile Arctic environment, the only remaining option for 
Arctic coastal states would be unilateral actions seeking to make the waters “internal 
waters”, as suggested by McRae and Goundrey.183 
In summary, it can be stated that the applicability of Article 234 in straits used for 
international navigation decisively depends on the used interpretation, either broad or 
narrow, of Article 234 itself. Given the fact that Article 233 does not extend to Article 
234, allows for the interpretation of the adoption of more stringent pollution control 
standards than those applying to straits used for international navigation in a less 
severe, more moderate climate.184 In line with the sui generis meaning of Article 234, 
outlined in Chapter 3.3, this argumentation would further strengthen the Canadian 
position. 
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4. Chapter IV – Canadian Legal Framework 
4.1. AWPPA and further developments 
The waters of the NWP became a high-profile issue between Canada and the US as 
a result of the discovery of oil at Prudhoe Bay in Alaska and the transit voyage of the 
SS Manhattan.185 The passage was interpreted by Canada as a direct challenge to 
Canadian sovereignty over the concerned area and an indirect threat to the Arctic 
environment.186 Canada’s functional response to the voyage resulted both in the 
enactment of the AWPPA, including regulations adopted thereunder, and the 
extension of the width of the Canadian territorial sea from 3 nm to 12 nm187, 
capturing most of the waters of the NWP as territorial waters. The spatial scope of 
the AWPPA extended to 100 nm from then-applicable baselines and was only 
amended to a geographical extension of 200 nm in 2009.188 This novel unilateral 
assertion of jurisdiction was undoubtedly inconsistent with then-existing international 
law but has to be understood in the context of the already described domestic and 
international perspective (e.g. domestic pressure, questions of national identity and 
sovereignty).189 The Canadian Prime Minister at that time, Pierre Elliot Trudeau 
described the AWPPA as a Canadian exercise of desire to keep the Arctic pollution-
free rather than an assertion of sovereignty.190 This point of view is highly criticized 
by Griffiths describing the Canadian approach as primarily a means of defending 
sovereignty.191 The US and some European countries, alleging Canada to violate 
international law, immediately protested against the enacted legislation.192 The US 
was especially concerned that the Canadian action could be taken as precedent for 
other unilateral infringements of the freedom of the seas.193 
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Yet the dispute over the AWPPA receded with the inclusion of Article 234 in 
UNCLOS. In fact the Article legitimized the Canadian unilateral approach194 and 
further permitted the extension of its application to the above-mentioned 200 nm limit. 
The AWPPA and the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Regulations (AWPPR) 
respectively conferred on Canada the right to enforce pollution control regulations on 
ships passing through Canadian Arctic waters.195 In particular it prohibits the deposit 
of any waste except permitted by regulations.196 It further establishes CDEM 
standards and navigation standards that are more stringent than GAIRAS.197 The 
owner of vessels and cargoes is required to provide evidence of financial 
responsibility (insurance, indemnity bond) and is liable for pollution caused 
damage.198 With regard to Arctic shipping, the AWPPA and the Arctic Shipping 
Pollution Prevention Regulations (ASPPR), respectively provides for the prescription 
of shipping safety control zones.199 Ships have to meet certain requirements relating 
to the design, construction, navigational safety and quantities of fuel and water on 
board, if they seek to operate in the specified waters.200 
 
4.2. Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Service Zone Regulations (NORDREG) 
Canada's NORDREG regulations201 are a mandatory ship reporting system for 
Canada’s Northern and Arctic Waters, promoting both safe and efficient navigation 
and the protection of the marine environment. It was introduced as a voluntary 
system in July 1977 to enhance safe movements of maritime transportation in Arctic 
waters and consequently safeguard the Arctic environment.202 Enabled by the 
Canadian Shipping Act 2001,203 the Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone 
Regulations, making vessel reporting mandatory in Canadian Arctic Waters, came 
into force on 1 July 2010.204 
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The regulations apply to vessels – domestic or foreign - of 300 gross tonnage or 
more, vessels engaged in towing or pushing another vessels (with a combined gross 
tonnage of 500 or more) and vessels carrying a pollutant or dangerous goods as 
cargo. For the purposes of the Canadian Shipping Act 2001, subsections 126 (1) and 
(3) stipulate that no vessel of the prescribed class shall enter, leave or proceed the 
zone without having previously obtained clearance. The regulations apply to all 
Canadian Arctic Waters and consequently cover internal waters, the territorial sea 
and the waters adjacent to the territorial sea (out to 200 nm). 
Figure3 illustrates the waters of the NORDREG Zone205: 
 
Figure 3 – Map of the NORDREG Zone 
Source: Transport Canada, Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services (NORDREG) 
http://www.tc.gc.ca/media/documents/marinesafety/nordreg-en.pdf Accessed 24 June 2011 
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4.2.1. Vessel Traffic Service (VTS): a definition 
“Vessel Traffic Service” (VTS) is a term adopted by the IMO to describe a shore-
based marine traffic monitoring system. The (revised) IMO Guidelines for Vessel 
Traffic Services, adopted by the IMO Assembly on 27 November 1997 as Resolution 
A.857(20) define a VTS as follows: 
 
“Vessel traffic service (VTS) - a service implemented by a Competent 
Authority, designed improve the safety and efficiency of vessel traffic and 
to protect the environment. The service should have the capability to 
interact with the traffic and to respond to traffic situations developing in the 
VTS area.”206 
 
Vessel traffic services were recognised by the revised SOLAS Chapter V on Safety 
of Navigation, regulation 12 (SOLAS 74, V/12), adopted in December 2000 and 
entered into force on 1 July 2002.207 The provision states that contracting 
governments may establish VTS by following the IMO Guidelines if the volume of 
traffic or the degree of risk justifies such services. Regulation 12 further stipulates 
that the use of VTS may only be mandatory in sea areas within the territorial sea.208 
Neither the revised provision nor the Guidelines shall prejudice the legal regime of 
straits used for international navigation. The IMO Guidelines distinguish between a 
Port or Harbour VTS and a Coastal VTS. Port/Harbour VTS are mainly concerned 
with vessel traffic approaching to a port/harbour, while a Coastal VTS is concerned 
with the transit traffic passing through the specified VTS area. A coastal VTS system 
explicitly involves a two-way communication between the shore and the participating 
vessel.209 
VTS shall allow the identification and monitoring of vessels and strategic 
planning of vessel movements. It can furthermore assist in prevention of pollution 
and co-ordination of pollution response.210 Accordingly, a VTS can both contribute to 
maritime safety and environmental protection, indicating a primary and secondary 
regulatory response. The IMO Guidelines give additional guidance with regard to 
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planning a VTS. Chapter 3.2.2 indicates several circumstances which could lead to 
VTS establishment, amongst others conflicting and complex navigation patterns, 
environmental considerations or difficult hydrographical and meteorological 
elements.211 
VTS’ are inextricably interlinked with other aspects of marine traffic management, 
e.g. traffic separation schemes and ship reporting systems (SRS) and frequently 
operate in conjunction.212 The general principles for SRS are outlined within IMO 
Resolution A.851(20)213, which is associated with SOLAS 74, Regulation V/11 on 
ship reporting systems.214 
 
5. Chapter V – In the matter of Article 234 vs. NORDREG 
5.1. The NORDREG debate at the IMO 
Unaffected by an indicated high level of compliance215 with the voluntary NORDREG 
system, several (Canadian) commentators regularly called for a mandatory nature of 
NORDREG,216 in order to enhance the Canadian control over (foreign) vessels. Yet 
critical views expressed that a unilateral implementation could consequently lead to 
formal letters of protest from countries contesting the Canadian internal waters claim 
in the NWP.217 
NORDREG’s mandatory nature was immediately contested both on a bilateral218 
and multilateral level. At the IMO’s 56th session of the Maritime Safety Committee’s 
(MSC) Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation (NAV), the US delegation and the 
observer of the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) raised critical 
questions with regard to the legal consistency of the NORDREG regulations under 
                                                        
211 IMO Guidelines for Vessel Traffic Services, adopted by IMO Assembly Resolution A.857(20), 27 
November 1997, Chapter 3.2.2 
212 Mapplebeck 2000, p. 136. For a critical review regarding the rapid growth of VTS and the linkage 
with SRS, see Hughes 2009 
213 IMO General Principles for Ship Reporting Systems and Ship Reporting Requirements, including 
Guidelines for Reporting Incidents involving Dangerous Goods, Harmful Substances and/or Marine 
Pollutants, adopted by IMO Assembly Resolution A.851(20), 27 November 1997, Chapter 1 
214 IMO Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Seventy-Third Session, MSC 73/21/Add.2, 14 
December 2000, Annex 7 
215 Canadian Senate Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans 2009, p. 58 
216 See, inter alia Beaufort Sea Environmental Assessment Panel 1984, p. 97; Pharand 2007, p. 50 
and Byers/Lalonde 2009, p. 1186 
217 Lackenbauer 2009, p. 34 
218 In a Note Verbale France urged Canada to present the regulations to the IMO for final approval, 
see French Note Verbale 2010 
  37 
international law.219 The US is reported to have said that the regulations were 
inconsistent with “key law of the sea principles related to the freedom of navigation, 
including the right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage through straits 
used for international navigation.”220 The statement reaffirms the US position on the 
legal status in the NWP, without explicitly mentioning the NWP. Both representatives 
acknowledged Canada’s policy to protect the Arctic marine environment but criticized 
the unilateral approach and wished for a prior evaluation and approval by the IMO.221 
Canada is reported to have answered that the regulations were consistent with 
international law, including Article 234 and SOLAS 74, regulations V/11 and V/12. 
Furthermore the regulations requirements were based on “accepted international 
guidelines for ship reporting systems”.222 
Prior to the 88th session of the MSC, the US and the International Association of 
Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO) submitted a joint document reaffirming 
concerns over the legal applicability of the NORDREG regulations with SOLAS 74, 
Chapter V but supporting Canada’s intention to provide for the safety of navigation 
and the protection of the Arctic marine environment.223 Yet the document 
substantiates the inconsistency of the regulations with SOLAS 74, regulations V/11 
and V/12 and specifically notes a discrepancy between NORDREG’s proposed 
spatial scope of 200 nm and its applicability with SOLAS 74, regulation V/12.3, which 
indicates the use of a mandatory VTS only within the territorial sea of a coastal 
state.224 
In its response, Canada reiterates its arguments by specifically outlining its rights 
and duties according to Article 234, which takes precedence over the territorial sea 
(12 nm) limitation225 and over SOLAS 74, regulations V/11 and V/12.226 According to 
the Canadian statement “Article 234 provides a complete legal justification in 
international law for NORDREG”.227 Canada holds the view that the NORDREG 
regulations are both a VTS and SRS, following the particular IMO Guideline, as well 
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as International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities 
(IALA) Recommendations.228 As requested by the US and INTERTANKO229, Canada 
also submitted, as already announced at NAV’s 56th session, information on 
NORDREG to the IMO for recognition under SOLAS 74, regulation V/11.4.230 Yet the 
US delegation made clear that such a submission for recognition is not an 
assessment by the IMO of the legitimacy of the system or the validity of its legal 
basis.231 The Canadian call for recognition implicates the above-mentioned nexus 
between VTS and SRS and further includes a traffic organization service (TOS). The 
Canadian way of proceeding has to be defined as diplomatic courtesy. Regulation 
V/11.4 clearly stipulates that governments may submit regulations for recognition, 
indicating a right rather than an obligation.232 Based on the assumed rights according 
to Article 234, which confirm the broad Canadian interpretation, the unilateral 
approach and a subsequent missing submission of information can be legally 
justified. Such an approach could further be regarded as an expression of political 
self-assertion based on legal confidence and classified in line with the “rocker of the 
boat” occasions. 
The debate continued during the 88th session of the MSC with several delegations 
advancing their opinion. In particular the delegation of Germany and Singapore 
supported the Canadian intention to protect the Arctic environment but criticized the 
unilateral approach and emphasized the leading competence of the IMO.233 In its 
statement, Singapore clarified its position that any possible measure taken to 
enhance the navigational safety in the Arctic should not compromise the freedom of 
navigation and that any application of Article 234 should be done with “due regard to 
navigation”.234 Yet the discussion saw delegations supporting the Canadian view 
considering the issue not within the remit of the IMO and other delegations 
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supporting the perspective that for the adoption of mandatory SRS and the 
establishment of VTS the procedures within SOLAS should be followed.235 
Additionally, the NAV subcommittee’s chairman summarized that the documents 
provided to the NAV highlight an ongoing bilateral discussion.236 Considering the 
delineated debate within an international forum, it has to be noted though that the 
NORDREG argument was upgraded to a multilateral level. 
Two pillars of argumentation summarize the NORDREG debate at the IMO and 
lead to the question if the NORDREG regulations are laws or regulation for the 
prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels and therefore 
consistent with international law, in particular Article 234. The Canadian view is 
based on the legal superiority of Article 234, taking precedence over SOLAS 74, 
chapter V. The opposite view, represented by the US, Germany and Singapore, 
states an inconsistency of the NORDREG regulations with SOLAS 74, regulations 
V/11 and V/12. Yet only Singapore reacted to the Canadian Article 234 
argumentation. 
 
5.2. Are the NORDREG regulations consistent under Article 234? 
The missing reference in Article 234 for pre-approval by the “competent international 
organization” strengthens the interpretation of a greater unilateral coastal state 
jurisdiction over specific ice-covered areas. This unilateral right was evidently 
asserted in Canada’s submission to the MSC.237 It contradicts the US assumption 
that any VTS, developed for utilization outside the territorial sea of a coastal state, 
needs prior evaluation and approval by the “competent international organization”.238 
The wording of Article 234 and the provided argumentation of interpretation in this 
respect, support the Canadian view of a unilateral approach. Yet the crucial point is 
the consideration of NORDREG as regulations specifically adopted for the 
prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered 
areas. 
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Yet again the either narrow or broad interpretation of the term “where”, as outlined in 
Chapter 3.3, has to be considered the essential starting point of argumentation. 
Article 234 stipulates that coastal states have the right to adopt laws and regulations 
to protect the fragile Arctic environment, covering both a primary purpose 
(environmental protection) and a secondary purpose (maritime safety). Based on the 
outlined interpretation the term “where” either indicates a spatial or a temporal 
meaning. As the Canadian Arctic Archipelago is undoubtedly an area where severe 
climatic conditions and the presence of ice coverage occur, the NORDREG 
regulations, presumably adopted to advance navigation in this region, cover the 
purpose of Article 234 to protect the fragile environment. This broad interpretation 
indicates that as long as a regulation is useful to protect the concerned environment, 
its adoption under Article 234 is legally justified. 
The narrow interpretation dictates that any law or regulation based on Article 234 
is only permitted where and when necessary. It implies that the NORDREG 
regulations were implemented based on the inevitable assumption that the 
regulations are not only useful, but also necessary to protect the Canadian Arctic 
environment. The regulations have to have a clear and distinct purpose, comparably 
to an economic cost-benefit analysis. Do the legal “costs” of implementation, e.g. 
unilateral approach in a plural defined area, benefit the envisaged outcome? It seems 
evident that any government invoking Article 234 would prefer the broad 
interpretation. Based on the indicated high level of compliance with the voluntary 
NORDREG system, the illustrated possible impacts of navigational accidents to the 
Arctic environment and NORDREG’s purpose to secure safe shipping and enhance 
the protection of the marine environment, it seems arguable that the NORDREG 
regulations are regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine 
pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas, even when considering a narrower 
interpretation. 
Another controversial point of discussion derives from the term “due regard to 
navigation”. In its statement to the MSC, Singapore questions the compatibility of 
NORDREG’s requirement to obtain prior clearance and the “due regard to 
navigation” clause in Article 234.239 Canada considers this condition fully consistent 
with the stipulated obligation in Article 234 to protect and preserve the marine 
environment, as it ensures a vessel to be capable to navigate through the hazardous 
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Arctic waters.240 Consequently implemented, the clearance requirement implicates 
the Canadian possibility to prohibit entrance in the NORDREG zone if a vessel does 
not comply with the imposed prerequisite. The above outlined sui generis 
interpretation of Article 234, giving a relatively greater weight to environmental 
considerations, fits NORDREG’s purpose and could as a matter of fact cover the full 
spatial territorial scope of 200 nm. In its submission to the MSC, Canada notes that 
the clearance and reporting requirements are not inconsistent with the obligation to 
give due regard to navigation, evident from the high level of compliance with the 
voluntary NORDREG system.241 
The Article’s sui generis connotation of its term “due regard to navigation” clearly 
indicates a legal compatibility of the NORDREG regulations based on Article 234 to 
that regard. Canada’s approach to establish a system based on the predefined IMO 
Guidelines and its later submission to the IMO for recognition under SOLAS 74, 
regulation V/11.4, contradict the perception of an entirely unilateral policy. The legal 
justification based on Article 234 can be considered rather unique; the line of action 
per se can to a certain extent be described as unilateralism mixed with multilateral 
flavour. 
Despite the sui generis characterization of “due regard to navigation”, the coastal 
states’ regulations have to be based upon adequate scientific knowledge. The 
dynamic characterization of science being in constant evolution242 and the coherent 
development of scientific knowledge imply the ability to improve and strengthen 
current laws and regulations. As already pointed out, a contemporary understanding 
of the provision, given the dynamics of the term “based on the best available 
scientific evidence”, does not require any regulation, based on Article 234, to be 
bound to the CDEM character of the AWPPA, which gave rise to the provision. 
Hence including an implicit implementation of a precautionary approach and the 
changing, dynamic nature of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, it must be assumed 
that NORDREG can be considered a regulation to protect the Arctic environment, 
comprising the “due regard to navigation” clause. 
None of the state parties involved in the discussion have yet mentioned 
NORDREG’s ramification to the controversial status of the NWP. However, the US is 
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reported to have said that the regulations are inconsistent with transit passage 
through international straits243, which implicitly reaffirms the country’s position with 
regard to the NWP. The continuing debate about the mandatory nature of 
NORDREG could evolve into a high-level, multilateral discussion regarding the legal 
status of the passage. It can be argued that the acceptance and further application of 
the mandatory NORDREG status could strengthen the Canadian position concerning 
its internal waters claim. Consequently, Canada would be entitled to exercise full 
sovereignty in its internal waters, without the duty to permit entry of foreign vessels 
into its ports with the exception of distress or force majeure. 
 
PART II 
6. Chapter VI – unilateral approach or bi-/multilateral solution? 
The aim of the following chapter is to comment on the political reasoning of the 
involved states with regard to their NORDREG related argumentation. It will further 
consider the question if the current disputed legal status of the NWP under 
international law lead to additional problems with regard to the NORDREG 
regulations. As already mentioned in Chapter 2.5 the Arctic is commonly visualized 
as an area of either conflict or cooperation with a common tendency by academic 
commentators, politicians and the popular press/mass media to oversimplify 
uncertain political, legal and economic processes. In this context it seems essential 
to note that the Arctic region is not an area of conflict per se, especially if compared 
to other regions of the world. The absence of an overarching legal treaty for the 
Arctic is often referred to as one component of the conflict argumentation.244 Yet the 
international legal framework of UNCLOS and associated legally binding instruments 
inevitable cover the Arctic Ocean as well. Arctic states have cooperated extensively 
since the early 1990s, with the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) 
being adopted in 1991 and the AEPS’ absorption into the Arctic Council in 1996. The 
intergovernmental forum of the Arctic Council has the possibility to influence the 
actions of its member states and enhance Arctic cooperation based on multilateral 
guidelines. The Ilulissat Declaration, adopted by the five Arctic coastal states, yet 
containing an agreed rejection regarding the development of a comprehensive legal 
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regime to govern the Arctic Ocean, represents the willingness of the concerned 
states to cooperate with each other and other interested parties.245 
The above outlined complex legal situation regarding NORDREG, its relationship 
with Article 234 and the controversial status of the NWP, are based on certain 
political approaches. The NORDREG discussion is encircled by the collision of two 
distinctly different orientations, where the responsibilities of a coastal state collide 
with the necessities of maritime states. Whereas Canada regards its Arctic region as 
a regional issue with special characteristics and the interest to attain almost exclusive 
control over its offshore areas, the US is concerned with global economic and military 
considerations and the maintenance of the freedom of navigation.246 From the 
Canadian perspective both the NWP and the present NORDREG discussion 
comprise a distinct sovereign element. McDorman describes the Canadian NWP 
approach as encapsulated within a “politics of sovereignty”.247 McRae summarizes 
Arctic sovereignty as a touchstone in the Canadian political debate with the inherent 
fear of losing national heritage in the north.248 Consequently, any debate regarding 
the northern area and its international legal status clearly features a distinct domestic 
element. The Canadian Arctic approach is delineated in the Canadian Northern 
Strategy and builds on four pillars: exercising the full extent of sovereignty, sovereign 
rights and jurisdiction; promoting economic and social development; protecting 
Canadian environmental heritage; and improving and devolving northern 
governance.249 The future challenges of the Arctic are supposed to be faced by Arctic 
cooperation – bilateral relations with the Arctic neighbours and multilateral 
collaboration through the regional mechanism of the Arctic Council and other 
institutions – with the US being considered the premium partner in the Arctic.250 
Irrespectively of this generally drafted strategy, Canada’s NORDREG approach and 
the related Canadian Arctic internal waters claim reveals prima facie two policy 
options: the continuation of its unilateral assertion, based on rather strong legal 
arguments in the particular case of NORDREG and partially in the NWP status 
debate, or an enhanced commitment to multilateral solutions. Yet Canada has not 
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undertaken any aggressive actions to support its unilateral assertions as these could 
impede Canada’s position if other states, in particular the US, ignore the imposed 
requirements by Canada.251 Multilateral cooperation, on the other hand, could ensure 
that internationally accepted standards conform with the desired Canadian 
regulations for Arctic waters.252 
However, the NORDREG debate at the IMO uncovered a third interrelated 
option, being in line with the “rocker of the boat” occasions, of a legally strong, 
unilateral starting position, embedded in a multilateral discussion within an 
international forum. Two main conclusions can be drawn from the current debate. 
First, the dispute regarding NORDREG demonstrated an international coverage with 
several states being actively involved. Considering a bigger picture and including the 
argumentation regarding the NWP’ legal status, the debate is rather a multilateral 
one than solely a bilateral one between Canada and the US.253 This first implication 
evidently leads to the second conclusion and Canada being rather surprised by the 
intensity of the debate at NAV and MSC. Although NORDREG is based on strong 
legal arguments, Canada’s submission for recognition strengthens the view that 
various disagreements with NORDREG took Canada by surprise. Arctic shipping is 
considered to be a matter of global concern. Canada’s unilateral approach, evidently 
hampering navigational rights in this area, could intensify international pressure on 
Canada and lead to further implications in the context of the NWP.  
The debate at the IMO was exclusively related to the consistency of the 
regulation itself with SOLAS 74 and with Article 234, respectively, and not to the 
NWP, its possible status as an international strait and its applicability with Article 234. 
The US is only reported to have said that NORDREG is hampering the right of transit 
passage through straits used for international navigation. However, the US remained 
silent on the relationship between transit passage and Article 234. Canada on the 
other hand did not rely on its internal waters claim during the NORDREG debate. 
Furthermore the regulations are carefully drafted, avoiding any nexus between 
NORDREG itself and the NWP. Based on these observations it can currently be 
concluded that the dispute regarding the legal status of the NWP does not explicitly 
influence the NORDREG debate, with both actors keeping the NWP dispute on a 
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lower level. Yet the mandatory nature of NORDREG and its consequent IMO debate 
transformed the issue to a multilateral level, with possible disadvantageous 
implications for Canada with regard to its claims in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago 
and the NWP, respectively. 
Both the debate regarding the legal compatibility of NORDREG with Article 234 
and the legal status of the NWP determine an essential component of the future 
Canadian Arctic policy. Will shipping in Canadian Arctic waters be regulated in 
accordance with self-determined rules and regulations or will Canada have to comply 
with GAIRAS and be conceivably limited by them? Could Canada influence GAIRAS 
to a self-determined extent? Based on a possible internationalization of the NWP, 
Canada will have to deal with vessels seeking to navigate through the NWP without 
complying with the NORDREG regulations. Consequently, Canada would have to 
enforce its self-imposed legal power and arrest concerned vessels. Is the Arctic state 
able to accept this legal challenge? 
During the Cold War period, the US provided almost exclusively for North 
American Arctic security against the Soviet Union by simultaneously being sensitive 
about the Canadian concerns of sovereignty,254 with the exceptions of the various 
examples mentioned above. This backup-policy allowed Canada “to free-ride on the 
Americans’ willingness to act”.255 The US itself seems to be limited in its Arctic policy 
approach. On the one hand, the freedom of navigation has been a cornerstone of US 
foreign policy and its specific oceans interests, deeply embedded in the US 
conscience.256 Agreeing to the Canadian NWP claim could set precedence, possibly 
encouraging other coastal states bordering an international strait.257 On the other 
hand, an aggressive approach regarding the international strait agenda would seem 
inconsistent with the US policy of enhanced North American Arctic security.258 Yet 
the US Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg indicated, that “security was not a 
dominant concern” with regard to the US Arctic policy.259 According to Huebert the 
actions taken by the US during the last 20 years imply a stronger US concern about 
the principle of freedom of navigation through international straits than any security 
                                                        
254 Huebert 2008, p. 15 and 16 
255 Ibid., p. 16 
256 Kraska 2007, p. 270 
257 Lalonde 2008, p. 11 
258 McDorman 2009, p. 227. Consequently, international strait considered NWP would be open and 
accessible for all ships (commercial or military), regardless the flag the concerned ship flies. 
259 Doyle 2009 
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benefits achieved through a Canadian regulated NWP.260 The US updated its Arctic 
Region Policy on 9 January 2009 by identifying seven areas of US interest and 
procedural steps to implement the policy: interests of national and homeland security, 
international governance, extended continental shelf and boundary issues, 
international scientific cooperation, maritime transportation, economic and energy 
issues, environmental protection and the conservation of the living resources.261 The 
presidential directive urges the US Senate to accede to UNCLOS in order to protect 
US interests with respect to the Arctic. 
In their detailed analysis, comparing the national strategies of the five Arctic 
coastal states, Brosnan, Leschine and Miles conclude that an Arctic Ocean conflict is 
not inevitable as numerous avenues for cooperation occur.262 Both Canada and the 
US have their distinct political considerations and approaches. It seems obvious that 
the lesser attention given to the legal status of the NWP, the better for the Canadian 
position. A low-level profile with regard to the dispute is supposed to be envisaged. 
Yet the debate at the IMO regarding the mandatory nature of the NORDREG 
regulations seems to be self-defeating with regard to the Canadian position. A direct 
confrontation between the two North American allies, e.g. tied by the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO) or the North American Aerospace Defense Command 
(NORAD), is highly unlikely, with both the NORDREG and NWP discussion 
remaining a political and diplomatic controversy. Yet as the debate has shown, it 
comprises rather a multilateral than bilateral element, with other states influencing 
the point of discussion. With regard to Canada the influence of domestic politics and 
the internally sensitive notion of Arctic sovereignty has to be considered a decisive 
feature of Canadian Arctic policy. The mandatory nature of NORDREG as an internal 
imperative is only one piece in the Canadian puzzle of Arctic sovereignty. Issues of 
sovereignty and the alleged “race” for hydrocarbon and natural resources have 
influenced the policy of all five Arctic coastal states. Canada, as indicated in this 
thesis, is not an exception. 
The Canadian NORDREG approach and its “positive” unilateral example of applying 
Article 234 could encourage other Arctic coastal states, with the exception of the US 
and its prominent flag state interests, to flex their “Article 234 muscle” and adopt 
similar laws and regulations to prevent environmental pollution in the Arctic region. 
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261 United States, The White House 2009 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Consequently, this possibility could strengthen the collaboration of the five coastal 
states and lead to an exclusive “Arctic-5-club”.263 
 
7. Chapter VII - Conclusions 
The thesis aimed to discuss the following three research questions: i) are the 
NORDREG regulations consistent with UNCLOS, Article 234, ii) does the disputed 
legal status of the NWP under international law lead to further problems with regard 
to the NORDREG regulations and iii) what is the political reasoning of the involved 
states arguing concerning a legal or non-legal applicability of the regulations with 
Article 234. 
According to the provided research it has to be concluded that Canada’s legal 
argumentation with regard to the applicability of the NORDREG regulations with 
Article 234 is solid and its application legally justified. Yet a broader or narrower 
interpretation of the Article influences the applicability to a certain extent. So far 
Article 234 has only been implemented by Canada and the Russian Federation with 
a broad interpretation of the Article. Comparing the academic literature it has to be 
noted that the interpretation of Article 234 and its legal purpose is mainly of Canadian 
commentator’s concern with a rather weak opposed point of view by other observers. 
This observation implicitly indicates the importance of Article 234 for the Canadian 
rationale and was likewise noticed with regard to the legal status of the NWP. 
The legal status of the NWP is a matter of national importance for Canada and its 
notion of sovereignty. NORDREG was especially implemented to enhance the 
security of navigation in the Canadian Arctic waters and consequently to protect the 
fragile Arctic environment. Yet the sovereignty issue constantly “joins the game”. 
Until now the international debate regarding the legal status of the NWP does not 
influence the application of NORDREG and its discussion or vice versa. NORDREG 
is carefully drafted, avoiding any nexus between the regulation itself and the status of 
the NWP. As a matter of fact, NORDREG requires clearance prior to the entry of the 
NORDREG Zone and not prior to the entry of the NWP. 
It was concluded that Article 234 is applicable to straits used for international 
navigation and could therefore still be implemented, even if the NWP would be 
considered an international strait. Hence the relating navigational rights under the 
international straits regime would not circumscribe the coastal states rights under 
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Article 234 with regard to the protection of the marine environment.264 Referring to 
the 2nd research question an opposite effect could occur, where the NORDREG 
discussions influence the NWP argumentations. Broad international compliance with 
the NORDREG regulations could evidently strengthen Canada’s position with regard 
to the legal status of the NWP. Yet the risk of a lower level of compliance, compared 
to the voluntary NORDREG system, could have a reverse effect. 
Canada, the US and other maritime states pursue distinct political goals. Both the 
Canadian and the US argumentation are reasoned by these considerations and 
illustrate the discrepancy between the notions of a coastal state and a maritime state. 
The vital importance of the North for the Canadian self-conception decisively 
influences the Canadian approach and its policy to protect the Arctic environment. 
Despite this assessment of political reality the country’s environmental effort should 
not be denied. 
                                                        
264 As outlined in Chapter 3.3.3 the applicability of Article 234 in straits used for international 
navigation depends on the used interpretation of Article 234 itself. If the powers, conferred on coastal 
states by Article 234, are more stringent and far reaching than those of Part III, an application of 
Article 234 to international straits seems to be legally reasonable. 
  49 
8. Bibliography 
Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, ACIA. ACIA Scientific Report, Chapter 1. An 
Introduction to the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, 2005. Pp. 1-20. 
http://www.acia.uaf.edu/PDFs/ACIA_Science_Chapters_Final/ACIA_Ch01_Final.pdf 
Accessed 31 May 2011 
 
Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment, AMSA. Arctic Council. Arctic Marine Shipping 
Assessment 2009 Report. 2009. 
http://www.pame.is/images/stories/PDF_Files/AMSA_2009_Report_2nd_print.pdf 
Accessed 15 June 2011 
 
Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, AMAP. Arctic Oil and Gas 2007. 
2007. http://www.amap.no/oga/ Accessed 24 June 2011 
 
Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, AMAP. Snow, Water, Ice and 
Permafrost in the Arctic. SWIPA 2011 Executive Summary, 2011. 
http://amap.no/swipa/SWIPA2011ExecutiveSummaryV2.pdf Accessed 31 May 2011 
 
Bartenstein, Kristin. The “Arctic Exception” in the Law of the Sea Convention: A 
Contribution to Safer Navigation in the Northwest Passage?, in: Ocean Development 
& International Law, Vol. 42:1&2 (2011). Pp. 22-52 
 
Beaufort Sea Environmental Assessment Panel. Beaufort Sea hydrocarbon 
production and transportation: final report of the Environmental Assessment Panel. 
1984. http://pubs.aina.ucalgary.ca/gran/14686.pdf Accessed 7 July 2011 
 
Birnie, Patricia, Alan Boyle and Catherine Redgwell. International Law & the 
Environment. Third Edition. Oxford/New York, 2009. 
 
Borgerson, Scott G. Arctic Meltdown. The Economic and Security Implications of 
Global Warming, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87 (2008). Pp 63-77 
 
Bouchez, Leo J. The regime of bays in international law. Leiden, 1964. 
 
Brosnan, Ian G., Thomas M. Leschine and Edward L. Miles. Cooperation or Conflict 
in a Changing Arctic?, in: Ocean Development & International Law. Vol. 42:1&2 
(2011). Pp. 173-210 
 
Brubaker, R. Douglas. The Russian Arctic straits. Leiden/Boston, 2005. (Note of the 
author: This version was accessed via the UiT’s ebrary-system. The hard copy of the 
book dates 2004) 
 
Brubaker, R. Douglas. The Arctic – Navigational Issues under International Law of 
the Sea, 2010. Pp. 1-77 (on file with author). 
Published under: The Arctic – Navigational Issues under International Law of the Sea, in: The 
Yearbook of Polar Law, Vol. 2, 2010. Leiden. Pp. 1-114. 
 
Byers, Michael and Suzanne Lalonde. Who controls the Northwest Passage, in: 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law. Vol. 42:4 (2009). Pp. 1133-1210 
 
  50 
Byers, Michael. Who owns the Arctic?: understanding sovereignty disputes in the 
North. Vancouver/Toronto/Berkeley, 2010. 
 
Chircop, Aldo. The Growth of International Shipping in the Arctic: Is a Regulatory 
Review Timely?, in: The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law. Vol. 24 
(2009). Pp. 355–380 
 
Chircop, Aldo. International Arctic Shipping: towards strategic scaling-up of marine 
environment protection, in: Changes in the Arctic environment and the law of the sea. 
Edited by Myron H. Nordquist, Tomas H. Heidar and John Norton Moore, 
Leiden/Boston, 2010. Pp. 177-201 
 
Churchill, Robin R. and A. Vaughan Lowe. The law of the sea. Third edition. 
Manchester, 1999. 
 
Churchill, Robin R. The impact of State practice on the jurisdictional framework 
contained in the LOS Convention, in: Stability and change in the Law of the Sea: The 
role of the LOS Convention. Edited by Alex G. Oude Elferink. Leiden/Bosten, 2005. 
Pp. 91-143 
 
De Mestral, Armand and L.H.J. Legault. Multilateral Negotiation: Canada and the 
Law of the Sea Conference, in: International Journal. Vol. 35:1 (1979/1980). Pp. 47-
69 
 
Doyle, Alister. U.S. to seek new cooperation in thawing Arctic, in: Reuters. 28 April 
2008. http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/04/28/us-climate-usa-interview-
idUSTRE53R7G620090428 Accessed 14 July 2011 
 
Franckx, Erik. Maritime Claims in the Arctic. Canadian and Russian Perspectives. 
Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1993. 
 
Franckx, Erik. The legal regime of navigation in the Russian Arctic, in: Journal of 
Transnational Law & Policy. Vol. 18:2 (2009). Pp. 327-342 
 
French Note Verbale, Nr. 1020, 12 August 2010 of the French Embassy in Canada to 
the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (on file with the 
author) 
 
Griffiths, Frankyln. Canadian Sovereignty and Arctic International Relations, in: The 
Arctic in question. Edited by Edgar J. Dosman. Toronto, 1976. Pp. 140-162 
 
Hoyle, Brian. The United States Government Perspective, in: The United States 
Without the Law of the Sea Treaty: Opportunities and Costs. Edited by Lawrence 
Juda. Wakefield, Rhode Island, 1983. Pp. 133-150 
 
Huebert, Rob. Article 234 and marine pollution jurisdiction in the Arctic, in: The Law 
of the Sea and polar maritime delimitation and jurisdiction. Edited by Alex G. Oude 
Elferink and Donald R. Rothwell. The Hague/New York/London, 2001. Pp. 249-267 
 
Huebert, Rob. The Shipping News Part II: How Canada's Arctic Sovereignty Is on 
Thinning Ice, in: International Journal. Vol. 58:3 (2003). Pp. 295-308 
  51 
Huebert, Rob. Canadian Arctic Security: preparing for a changing future, in: Behind 
the Headlines. Vol. 65:4 (2008). Pp. 14-21. http://www.opencanada.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/05/BTH_vol65_no41.pdf Accessed 14 July 2011 
 
Hughes Terry. When is a VTS not a VTS?, in: The Journal of Navigation, Vol. 62:3 
(2009). Pp. 439-442 
 
International Law Commission, ILC. Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, including 
Historic Bays. Document A/CN.4/143: Study prepared by the Secretariat, in: 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1962, Vol. II. Documents of the 
fourteenth session including the report of the Commission to the General Assembly. 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/Ybkvolumes(e)/ILC_1962_v2_e.pdf 
Accessed 27 June 2011 
 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC. Climate Change 2007: 
Synthesis Report, 2007. http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf Accessed 31 May 2011 
 
Jensen, Øystein. The IMO Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-covered 
Waters. From Voluntary to Mandatory Tool for Navigation Safety and Environmental 
Protection?, in FNI Report 2 2007. http://www.fni.no/doc&pdf/FNI-R0207.pdf 
Accessed 19 May 2011 
 
Koh, Tommy T. B. The Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone, Straits and Archipelagos 
under the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, in: Malaya Law Review. Vol. 29 
(1987). Pp. 163-199 
 
Koivurova, Timo and Erik J. Molenaar. International Governance and Regulation of 
the Marine Arctic. Three reports prepared for the WWF International Arctic 
Programme. 2009. http://assets.panda.org/downloads/3in1_final.pdf Accessed 1 July 
2011 
 
Koivurova, Timo. Alternatives for an Arctic Treaty – Evaluation and a New Proposal, 
in: Review of European Community & International Environmental Law. Vol. 17:1 
(2008). Pp. 14-26 
 
Kraska, James. The Law of the Sea Convention and the Northwest Passage, in: The 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law. Vol. 22:2 (2007). Pp. 257-282 
 
Kraska, James. International Security and International Law in the Northwest 
Passage, in: Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law. Vol. 42:4 (2009). Pp. 1109-
1132 
 
Lackenbauer, P. W. Mixed messages from an “Arctic superpower”? Sovereignty, 
security and Canada’s northern strategy, in: Atlantisch Perspectief. Vol. 35:3 (2011). 
Pp. 4-8. http://www.atlcom.nl/upload/AP%202011%20nr_%203.pdf Accessed 17 
June 2011 
  52 
Lalonde, Suzanne. Increased traffic through Canadian Arctic waters - Canada's state 
of readiness, in: Revue judiciaire Thémis. Vol. 38:1 (2004). Pp. 53-124. 
http://www.editionsthemis.com/uploaded/revue/article/rjtvol38num1/02-Lalonde.pdf 
Accessed 6 July 2011 
 
Lalonde, Suzanne. Arctic Waters: Cooperation or Conflict?, in: Behind the Headlines. 
Vol. 65:4 (2008). Pp. 8-14. http://www.opencanada.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/05/BTH_vol65_no41.pdf Accessed 14 July 2011 
 
Lee, Martin L. The Interrelation between the Law of the Sea Convention and 
Customary International Law, in: San Diego International Law Journal. Vol. 7 (2005-
2006). Pp. 405-420 
 
Legal aspects of Arctic shipping. Summary Report. Molenaar, Erik (et. al.) 2010. 
http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/pdf/legal_aspects_arctic_shipping_summary_en.p
df Accessed 21 June 2011 
 
Mapplebeck, Graham. Management of Navigation through Vessel Traffic Service, in: 
Navigational rights and freedoms and the new Law of the Sea. Edited by Donald R. 
Rothwell and Sam Bateman. The Hague/London/Boston, 2000. Pp. 136-143 
 
Macko, Stephen A. Changes in the Arctic Environment, in: Changes in the Arctic 
environment and the law of the sea. Edited by Myron H. Nordquist, Tomas H. Heidar 
and John Norton Moore. Leiden/Boston, 2010. Pp. 107-129 
 
McDorman, Ted L. In the wake of the Polar Sea. Canadian Jurisdiction and the 
Northwest Passage, in: Marine Policy. Vol. 10:4 (1986). Pp. 243-257 at p. 250 
 
McDorman, Ted L. Salt water neighbors: international ocean law relations between 
the United States and Canada. New York/Oxford, 2009.  
 
McDorman, Ted L. The Northwest Passage: international law, politics and 
cooperation, in: Changes in the Arctic environment and the law of the sea. Edited by 
Myron H. Nordquist, Tomas H. Heidar and John Norton Moore. Leiden/Boston, 2010. 
Pp. 227-250 
 
McRae, Donald M. and D.J. Goundrey. Environmental Jurisdiction in Arctic Waters: 
The Extent of Article 234, in: University of British Columbia Law Review. Vol. 16 
(1982). Pp. 197-228 
 
McRae, Donald M. The Negotiation of Article 234, in: Politics of the Northwest 
Passage, Edited by Franklyn Griffiths. Kingston/Montreal, 1987. Pp. 98-114 
 
McRae, Donald M. Arctic Sovereignty? What is at Stake?, in: Behind the Headlines. 
Vol. 64:1 (2007). Pp. 1-23. http://www.opencanada.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/05/BTH_vol64_no11.pdf Accessed 28 June 2011 
 
Melling, Humfrey. Sea ice of the northern Canadian Arctic Archipelago, in: Journal of 
Geophysical Research, Vol. 107 (2002). Pp. 1-21 
 
  53 
Mills, David. Ocean Policy and Management in the Arctic, in: Ocean Policy and 
Management in the Arctic. Ottawa, 1984. Pp. 11-50 
 
Moe, Arild and Øystein Jensen. Opening of new Arctic Shipping Routes. Standard 
Briefing. Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, European Parliament. 
2010. http://tepsa.be/Arild%20Moe_%C3%98ystein%20JENSEN.pdf Accessed 15 
June 2011 
 
Molenaar, Erik J. Coastal State Jurisdiction over Vessel-Source Pollution. The 
Hague/Boston/London 1998. 
 
Molenaar, Erik. J. Arctic Marine Shipping: Overview of the International Legal 
Framework, Gaps, and Options, in: Journal of Transnational Law & Policy. Vol. 18:2 
(2009). Pp. 289-236 
 
Pharand, Donat. Historic Waters in International Law with Special Reference to the 
Arctic, in: The University of Toronto Law Journal. Vol. 21:1 (1971). Pp. 1-14 
 
Pharand, Donat. The Northwest Passage in International Law, in: Canadian 
Yearbook of International Law. Vol. 17 (1979). Pp. 99-133 
 
Pharand, Donat. La contribution du Canada au développement du droit international 
pour la protection du milieu marin : Le cas spécial de l’Arctique, in: Études 
internationales. Vol. 11 (1980). Pp. 441-466 
 
Pharand, Donat. Canada’s Arctic waters in international law. Cambridge, 1988. 
 
Pharand, Donat. The Arctic Waters and the Northwest Passage: A Final Revisit, in: 
Ocean Development & International Law. Vol. 38:1 (2007). Pp. 3-69 
 
Plant, Glen. The Relationship between International Navigation Rights and 
Environmental Protection: A Legal Analysis of Mandatory Ship Traffic Systems, in: 
Competing Norms in the Law of marine Environmental Protection. Focus on Ship 
Safety and Pollution Prevention. Edited by Henrik Ringbom. London/The 
Hague/Boston, 1997. Pp. 11-29 
 
President Ronald Reagan Statement on United States Oceans Policy, March 10, 
1983. http://www.oceanlaw.org/index.php?module=News&func=display&sid=101 
Accessed 20 June 2011 
 
Reus-Smit, Christian. Introduction, in: The Politics of International Law. Edited by 
Christian Reus-Smit. Cambridge/New York/Melbourne et al., 2004. Pp. 1-13 
 
Rothwell, Donald. R. The Canadian-U.S. Northwest Passage Dispute: A 
Reassessment, in: Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 26 (1993). Pp. 331-372 
 
Stein, Arthur A. Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World, in: 
International Organization. Vol. 36 (2) International Regimes (1982). Pp. 299-324 
 
Stein, Arthur A. Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International 
Relations. Ithaca, New York, 1990. 
  54 
Symmons, Clive R. Historic waters in the law of the sea: a modern re-appraisal. 
Leiden/Boston, 2008. 
 
Tan, Alan K.-J. Vessel-Source Marine Pollution. The Laws and Politics of 
International Regulation. Cambridge, 2006. 
 
The Canadian Encyclopedia. Arctic Archipelago. 2011. 
http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=A1ARTA
0000292 Accessed 14 June 2011 
 
The Canadian Yearbook of International Law, CYIL. Canadian Practice in 
International Law during 1973 as Reflected Mainly in Public Correspondence and 
Statements of the Department of External Affairs Note, compiled by Edward G. Lee. 
Vol. 12 (1974). Pp. 272-303 
 
The Canadian Yearbook of International Law, CYIL. Canadian Practice in 
International Law during 1985. Parliamentary Declarations, compiled by Maureen 
Irish and A.L.C. de Mestral. Vol. 24 (1986). Pp. 404-456 
 
Tomczak, Matthias and Godfrey, J. Stuart. Regional Oceanography. An Introduction. 
2nd Edition. 2001. 
http://www.es.flinders.edu.au/~mattom/regoc/pdffiles/colour/single/07P-Arctic.pdf 
Accessed 15 June 2011 (Note of the author: The hard copy of the book dates 2003) 
 
Trouwborst, Arie. The Precautionary Principle in General International Law: 
Combating the Babylonian Confusion, in: Review of European Community & 
International Environmental Law. Vol. 16:2 (2007). Pp. 185-195 
 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982. A Commentary. Volume IV, 
Article 192 to 278, Final Act, Annex VI. Edited by Myron H. Nordquist (Editor-in-
Chief), Shabtai Rosenne and Alexander Yankov (Volume Editors) and Neal R. 
Grandy (Assistant Editor). Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1991. 
 
United States, The White House. National Security Presidential Directive and 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive NSPD-66 / HSPD-25. Subject: Arctic 
Region Policy. 9 January 2009. http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2009/01/20090112-3.html Accessed 14 July 
2011 
 
US Arctic Research Commission, USARC. Arctic Marine Transport Workshop, 28-30 
September 2004. http://www.arctic.gov/publications/arctic_marine_transport.pdf 
Accessed 16 June 2011 
 
United States Department of State (Bureau of Oceans and International 
Environmental and Scientific Affairs). Limits in the Seas. No. 112. United States 
Responses to Excessive National Maritime Claims. 1992. 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/58381.pdf Accessed 14 July 2011 
  55 
VanderZwaag, David. Shipping and Marine Environmental Protection in Canada: 
Rocking the Boat and Riding a Restless Sea, in: Navigational rights and freedoms 
and the new Law of the Sea. Edited by Donald R. Rothwell and Sam Bateman. The 
Hague/London/Boston, 2000. Pp. 209 – 229 
 
VanderZwaag, David and Aldo Chircop. Governance of Arctic Marine Shipping. 
Project Report PAME, 2008. 
http://www.pame.is/images/stories/AMSA/AMSA_Background_Research_Documents
/History_and_Governance_of_Arctic_Shipping/2.5-Governance-of-Arctic-Marine-
Shipiping.pdf Accessed 20 June 2011 
 
Young, Oran. The Arctic in Play: Governance in a Time of Rapid Change, in: The 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law. Vol. 24 (2009). Pp. 423-442 
 
 
Canadian Policy, Laws, Regulations and Statements 
Act to amend the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, S.C. 2009. 
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/PDF/2009_11.pdf Accessed 4 July 2011 
 
Arctic Shipping Pollution Prevention Regulations (ASPPR), C.R.C., c. 353. 
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/PDF/C.R.C.,_c._353.pdf Accessed 4 July 2011 
 
Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA), R.S.C., 1985, c. A-12. http://laws-
lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/A-12.pdf Accessed 4 July 2011 
 
Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Regulations (AWPPR), C.R.C., c. 354. http://laws-
lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/C.R.C.,_c._354.pdf Accessed 4 July 2011 
 
Canada Shipping Act, 2001 (S.C. 2001, c. 26). http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/C-
10.15.pdf Accessed 24 June 2011 
 
Canadian Senate Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans. Rising to the Arctic 
Challenge: Report on the Canadian Coast Guard. Report of the Standing Senate 
Committee on Fisheries and Oceans. 2009. 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/402/fish/rep/rep02may09-e.pdf 
Accessed 7 July 2011 
 
Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations (SOR/2010-127). 
http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/SOR-2010-127.pdf Accessed 24 June 2011 
 
Order Amending the Shipping Safety Control Zones Order (SOR/2010-131), in: 
Canada Gazette Part II. Vol. 144:13, 23 June 2010. http://www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-
pr/p2/2010/2010-06-23/pdf/g2-14413.pdf Accessed 6 July 2011 
 
Shipping Safety Control Zones Order (C.R.C., c. 356). http://laws-
lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/C.R.C.,_c._356.pdf Accessed 24 June 2011 
 
Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy. Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting 
Canada’s NORTHERN STRATEGY Abroad, 2009. 
http://www.international.gc.ca/polar-polaire/assets/pdfs/CAFP_booklet-PECA_livret-
eng.pdf Accessed 13 July 2011 
  56 
IMO instruments and statements 
Canada. Comments on document MSC 88/11/2. MSC 88/11/3, 5 October 2010 
 
Canada, Information on the Mandatory Canadian Ship Reporting System in Canada’s 
Northern Waters (NORDREG), SN.1/Circ.291, 5 October 2010 
 
International Maritime Organization, IMO. General Principles for Ship Reporting 
Systems and Ship Reporting Requirements, including Guidelines for Reporting 
Incidents involving Dangerous Goods, Harmful Substances and/or Marine Pollutants 
adopted by IMO Assembly Resolution A.851(20), 27 November 1997 
 
International Maritime Organization, IMO. Guidelines for Vessel Traffic Services 
adopted by IMO Assembly Resolution A.857(20), 27 November 1997 
 
International Maritime Organization, IMO. Report of the Maritime Safety Committee 
on its Seventy-Third Session. MSC 73/21/Add.2, 14 December 2000 
 
International Maritime Organization, IMO. Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar 
Waters adopted by IMO Assembly Resolution A.1024(26), 2 December 2009. 
http://docs.imo.org/Shared/Download.aspx?did=58610 Accessed 15 June 2011 
(Registration to access necessary) 
 
International Maritime Organization, IMO. Report to the Maritime Safety Committee. 
Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation on its Fifty-Sixth Session. NAV 56/20, 31 
August 2010 
 
International Maritime Organization, IMO. Report of the Maritime Safety Committee 
on its eighty-eighth session. MSC 88/26, 15 December 2010 
 
International Maritime Organization, IMO. Report of the Maritime Safety Committee 
on its eighty-eighth session, Annexes 2 to 33. MSC 88/26/Add.1, 19 January 2011 
 
United States and INTERTANKO. Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone 
Regulations. MSC 88/11/2, 22 September 2010 
 
 
International Conventions, multi- and bilateral agreements and other legal 
means 
Canada and United States of America. Agreement on Arctic Cooperation. Ottawa, 
Canada (11 January 1988). 
http://untreaty.un.org/unts/60001_120000/30/4/00058175.pdf Accessed 23 June 
2011 
 
Fisheries case, Judgment of December 18th, I95I: ICJ Reports 1951. http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/5/1809.pdf Accessed 27 June 2011 
 
International Legal Materials, American Society of International Law. Canadian 
Declaration Concerning the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice. Vol. 9 (1970a). Pp. 598-599 
 
  57 
International Legal Materials, American Society of International Law. Canadian Prime 
Minister’s Remarks on the Proposed Legislation. Vol. 9 (1970b). Pp. 600-604 
 
International Legal Materials, American Society of International Law. U.S. Statement 
on Canada’s Proposed Legislation. Vol. 9 (1970c). Pp. 605-606 
 
The Declaration on Establishment of the Arctic Council (The Ottawa Declaration) 
1996. http://arctic-council.org/filearchive/ottawa_decl_1996-3..pdf Accessed 15 June 
2011 
 
The Ilulissat Declaration, Arctic Ocean Conference, Ilulissat, Greenland (May 28, 
2008). http://arctic-council.org/filearchive/the_ilulissat_declaration Accessed 15 June 
2011 
 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982. 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/UNCLOS-TOC.htm 
Accessed 31 May 2011 
 






Annex1: The Territories 
Source: Natural Resources Canada 
http://atlas.nrcan.gc.ca/site/english/maps/reference/provincesterritories/northern_territories/reference
map_image_view Accessed 14 June 2011) 
